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ABSTRACT 
 
The ICSID has shifted the scope of investor-state disputes from domestic legal 
systems to international law realm. It assigns regulatory disputes between states and 
individuals to one-off private panels rather than public law courts. While investment 
treaty arbitration (ITA) combines the form and procedure of commercial arbitration, it 
performs under the substantive principles of public law. Since the ICSID does not set 
out the substantive rules governing investment disputes, investment treaty tribunals 
have constantly been the most dynamic zone of international investment law. Drawing 
on the ICSID neoliberal orientation, tribunals have interpreted and applied the 
substantive investment standards far beyond the consent of the treaty parties. They 
have largely intruded into domestic matters that lie within the host state sovereign 
authority. Moreover, they maintained a domestic normative scheme favourable to 
foreign investment that obviously exceeds international minimum standards of 
treatment. A minimal governmental regulatory action becomes an interference with 
the use of foreign private property that amounts to compensatory expropriation. The 
aim of this thesis is to reform investment treaty tribunals' law-making from within. 
Remoulding ITA as public law adjudication, this thesis sets out a comparative public 
law methodology for refining the content and scope of the open-ended standards for 
investment protection. It draws on the customary rules of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties as a basis for interpreting investment treaty terms. This thesis 
seeks to reconceptualise the objectives of ITA under the ICSID legal framework. It 
emphasizes the correlation between investment protection and the host state's right to 
economic development. Further, it integrates rules on corporate social responsibility 
to equiponderate the host states' international responsibility vis-à-vis foreign 
investors. Finally, this thesis points out to the significance of incorporating general 
principles of law and judicial decisions as recognized sources of public international 
law into the practice of ITA. It argues that accommodating the principle of 
proportionality as a general principle of law in the tribunals' law-making process 
would help draw the line between investment protection and state regulation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The advent of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
– under the Washington Convention – has drastically transformed traditional 
international arbitration from the reciprocal relationship to the regulatory sphere.
1
 
Through a wide network of Bilateral and Multilateral Investment Treaties (B/MITs), 
individuals and multinational corporations are now able to directly initiate, arbitrate 
and enforce international proceedings against sovereign states. In that capacity, 
Investment Treaty Arbitration (ITA) acts as a fundamental legal tool of public 
international law that reviews and adjudicates on states' exercise of public authority 
vis-à-vis foreign investors.
2
 However, the lack of a multilateral legal framework on 
the substantive standards of investment protection under the ICSID has invested one-
off investment treaty tribunals' extensive law-making powers.
3
  
The absence of an effective mechanism to review inconsistent awards has led to 
divergent approaches on a case-by-case-basis.
4
 Drawing on the ICSID neoliberal 
orientation, most investment treaty tribunals have recognized expansive 
interpretations of open-ended treaty standards in favor of private transnational 
investment. These interpretations give rise to legal instability in the practice of ICSID 
tribunals. As a result of this, a large number of privately-minded awards have 
diminished host states' legitimate regulatory power, maintained a domestic legal order 
that fairly exceeds international minimum standards of treatment and deprived host 
states the right to counterclaim against transgressor investors for breaches committed 
in the course of their investment.
5
 In that sense, ICSID creates a one-sided model of 
adjudication that seriously demands search for an alternative approach to strike a 
balance between the interests of foreign investors and host state.  
                                                          
1
 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, March 18, 1965, U.N., World Bank Group, International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, available at   https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/Pages/default.aspx 
 (The convention is commonly known as the „ICSID Convention‟ or the 'Washington Convention') 
(159 states have signed and 151 have ratified the ICSID Convention), available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/ 
2
 See Van Harten & Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative 
Law, 17 EJIL, no. 1, 145-148 121-150, (2006) 
3
 See Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute System Design, 92 MINN L.    
REV. 191 161- 230, (2008) 
4
 Id. at 170 
5
 See supra note 2 at 127-131 
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Over the past decade, respondent states discontent with ICSID's inclination to private 
transnational investment has reached a climax. The expansionary interpretations of 
central investment provisions by privately-contracted arbitrators have proved to be 
detrimental to the legitimacy of the system at large.
6
 The lack of a conclusive basis for 
states consent to the ICSID jurisdiction has cursed the practice of ITA with 
unpredictability.
7
 Investment treaty tribunals have endorsed a restrictive approach that 
relies on textual meaning in defining the scope of "protected investment", while 
ignoring the main objective of ICSID in promoting host states' economic 
development. In doing so, tribunals have intruded into matters of mere administrative 
discretion that lie within the sovereign authority of the treaty parties. Inflexible 
investment protection has vigorously contravened inherent regulatory functions of the 
host states in pursuing legitimate policies essential to ensure public welfare. 
Therefore, a significant part of the literature criticizes the current practice of 
investment treaty tribunals for favoring multinational corporations at the expense of 
the developing host states‟ socio-economic needs.8  
It is evident that the global network of B/MITs creates an overarching body of 
international investment regime.
9
 Yet, the vaguely-drafted investment treaty terms, 
including Indirect Expropriation, Fair and Equitable Treatment and Most Favored 
Nation, allow arbitrators wide leeway in reinterpreting the substantive rights of the 
treaty parties. In many cases, despite similarities in facts and merits, investment treaty 
tribunals have strikingly reached contradictory legal conclusions. Such divergent 
practice touches fundamentally on the claims of systematic institutional bias of the 
ICSID. Even though a judicial-like process was intended to disentangle the disputed 
public and private interests in investor-state disputes, a neoliberal ideology has been 
bestowed upon ICSID tribunals.
10
 An epistemic hegemony of commercial arbitrators 
                                                          
6
 See Susan D. Franck, the Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law through Inconsistent Decisions, 22 FORDHAM L. REV.  No. 73, 1521- 1625 (2005) 
7
Id. 
8
 See MARIE-CLAIRE CORDONIER SEGGER ET AL, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD 
INVESTMENT LAW 25, 623-625, (2
nd
 edition, Kluwer Law International Publisher) (2011) 
9
Id.  
10
See Gus Van Harten, Perceived bias in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in M. Waibel et al., 433-454, 
(2010) 
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over investment disputes has transformed ICSID into a multinational corporations-
friendly system of dispute settlement.
11
  
Therefore, the development of international investment law as an autonomous regime 
has come to a standstill since tribunals' interpretive approaches are no longer 
supported by state practice. Despite the fact that the private law tendency provides 
foreign investors with a high threshold of protection against unfair and discriminatory 
treatment by the host state, it ultimately restrains the latter from exercising legitimate 
regulatory powers in matters of public policy.
12
 In addition, it gives foreign investors 
a means to penetrate into the host states' domestic sociopolitical scheme and influence 
governmental choices. In fact, such penetration contradicts the principle of non-
intervention at the heart of public international law. Furthermore, it challenges the 
negative role of ITA in blocking essential policies in matters of common concern 
including health, environment, human rights, finance and taxation.
13
 
Since the early 1990s, innumerable arbitral awards worth billions of dollars have been 
rendered. These costly damages have severely impacted the host states' capacity to 
pursue developmental policies or implement social security programs. The precarious 
practice of ITA has resulted in immense confusion on whether entering into BITs is 
beneficial for developing economies, or it is detrimental for possibly resulting in large 
sums of damages to already low-income host states with modest shares of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI); does ITA actually play a decisive role in the process of 
economic development that justifies the surrender of sovereign immunity from 
adjudication in return for the promise of FDI? This discrepancy has led many states to 
renegotiate the terms of their B/MITs on much stricter provisions to come in line with 
domestic social and economic programs.
14
  
The chain of global economic crises in the 2000s has yielded a new generation of 
BITs providing for more regulatory space in public law fields of action. A shift in 
roles between inward and outward sources has resulted in the emergence of new 
                                                          
11
 Id. 
12
 Id.  
13
 See supra note 6 at 1589-1590  
14
 For example, the India-U.S. 2012 model BIT has introduced major changes regarding the Investor‟s 
scope of obligations most notably in paying taxes, fighting corruption and exhausting local remedies 
before Administrative and judicial bodies.   
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capital-exporting powers. New defences of state non-compensable measures have 
been triggered before arbitral tribunals. The host states' backlash to the system pitfalls 
has driven some investment treaty tribunals under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) to rediscover customary principles of international law in order 
to balance between investment protection and state regulation, particularly in health 
and environmental regulation. International law principle of sovereign independence 
has been brought back to life in some NAFTAs' arbitrations. Nevertheless, such 
semantic evolution is not equally reflected in ICSID's tribunals law-making.  
 
Observing the regulatory nature of investment treaty disputes, some academics 
highlight the importance of a public law approach in the process of interpreting 
investment treaty terms.
15
 Yet, the jurisprudence on investment arbitration shows 
meagre attempts to accommodate public law standards of review in investment treaty 
arbitration. Instead of a substantive law reform, a major part of the literature on ITA 
puts forward a number of institutional and procedural measures to address the current 
fragmentation of the International Investment law.
16
 I believe that this path of reform 
is contingent on either renegotiating the ICSID Convention or realizing a Multilateral 
Agreement on International Investment (MAI) to replace the diverse network of 
B/MITs. Despite being comprehensive, this reform seems infeasible due to the 
ongoing conflict of interests between transnational corporations and host states.  
 
Drawing on the public law foundation of ITA, this thesis adopts a pragmatic approach 
based on the self-reformation of investment treaty tribunals. Thinking of ITA as a 
public law adjudication may allow for remolding ICSID's tribunals' law-making 
process to consider public law standards of judicial review. Even though investment 
law scholarship rarely uses a comparative public law approach, I suggest it may offer 
a promising avenue for reforming international investment law from within.  
 
Against this background, in chapter I, I explore the legal hybridity of investment 
treaty arbitration. I contend that ITA has two different phases that go hand-in-hand. 
                                                          
15
STEPHAN W. SCHILL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, 1-36 (2nd 
edition Oxford University Press) (2010)  
16
Id.  
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First, it involves the interplay between domestic and international jurisdiction. 
Second, it entails a dichotomy between public and private interests in investment 
disputes. Although ITA combines the form and procedure of commercial arbitration, 
it performs under the substantive principles of public international law.  
In chapter II, I scrutinize the current network of ITA under ICSID's legal framework. 
In section one, I review the respective case law on the law-making process of 
investment treaty tribunals. First, I appraise the attitude of different tribunals towards 
variations in relevant investment treaty terms and whether the latter affect their final 
legal reasoning. In section two, I critically examine the asymmetric jurisdictional 
basis of ICSID in defining both the "protected investment" and the "protected 
investor".  
In section three, I briefly investigate the allegations of institutional bias through 
evaluating the process of arbitral appointments under the ICSID legal system. Then, I 
assess the lack of binding precedent and supervisory mechanism in light of the current 
practice of ITA and whether such lack accounts for the fragmentation of international 
investment law. Finally, I analyze the main approaches used by investment treaty 
tribunals to define the concept of indirect expropriation and whether they respond to 
state legitimate regulation.  
In chapter III, I set out a three-pronged framework for reforming investment treaty 
tribunal law-making. First, I lay out an interpretive approach for investment treaty 
standards of treatment. To that effect, I draw on the customary rules of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) as a basis for interpreting the substantive 
rights of treaty parties. Building on the same line of argument, in section two, I rely 
on the conceptual framework of the Washington Convention to firstly emphasize the 
correlation between investment protection and the host state's right of economic 
development as a main objective of ICSID, and secondly integrate rules on corporate 
social responsibility to restore legal equilibrium between investment protection and 
state regulation. 
In section three, I point out to the significance of the general principles of law and 
judicial decisions as recognized sources of public international law in reforming ITA 
from within. Further, I argue for accommodating the principle of proportionality as a 
6 
 
general principle of law in investment treaty tribunals law-making. Finally, I propose 
a proportionality analysis three-step test to delineate the boundary between 
compensatory expropriation and non-compensatory state regulation. 
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II. THE HYBRID NATURE OF INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 
Foreign investors have always sought to protect their property rights and secure their 
businesses against the sovereign powers of host states. Thus, they frequently relied on 
the exercise of diplomatic protection by their home states.
17
 Yet, diplomatic 
protection was dependent on the full discretionary power of the investor‟s home state, 
regardless of the merits of a given dispute.
18
 This discretion had essentially implied 
political, economic and most notably military considerations inter alia the investor‟s 
home state and the host state.
19
 On the other side, domestic settlement of investment 
disputes through the national legal system of the host state proved to be problematic 
for foreign investors‟ interests. For that reason, investor-state arbitration was 
envisaged in the first place to provide foreign investors with substantive legal 
protection against the host-state's exercise of public authority.
20
  
In harmony with its hybrid nature, Investment Treaty Arbitration (ITA) is formed by a 
sovereign act whereby a host state voluntarily waives its sovereign immunity from 
adjudication.
21
 Domestically, a state may consent to international investment 
arbitration through enacting domestic investment legislation that recognizes 
arbitration in future disputes with foreign investors operating on its territories.
22
 
Consequently, national courts shall be suspended from exercising their territorial 
jurisdiction over foreign investment disputes.
23
 On the international level, a state may 
conclude Bilateral or Multilateral Investment Treaties (B/MITs) or join Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) which provide for investment arbitration before ICSID tribunals. 
In that case, the investor‟s home state cannot subsequently claim diplomatic 
protection over the dispute. This means that even though ITA is originally formulated 
by a public law act, it proceeds as a private law model of dispute settlement.
24
  
                                                          
17
 See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: 
STANDARDS OF TREATMENT, 5-7 (1
st
 edition, Kluwer Law International Publisher) (2009) 
18
 Id.  
19
 Id. at 8-10 
20
 See CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: THE RELEVANCE 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INVESTMENT DISPUTES, 1- 22, (2
nd
 edition, Oxford University 
Press)  (2012) 
21
 Id. 
22
 Id. at 2-5 
23
 Id. at 10  
24
 Id.  
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The ICSID does not constitute a permanent court for investment disputes in the 
ordinary meaning of public international law. While interpreting B/MITs at issue, 
ICSID panels make selective reference to customary rules of international law 
applicable to investment including most notably rules of lex mercatoria. The mixed 
role of public and private law appears more confusing when it comes to the 
application of central investment standards within the merits of the dispute, namely, 
the rights and obligations of both parties under an investment treaty. The ICSID's 
inclination to private law is manifestly reflected in the practice of investment treaty 
tribunals.
25
 Its ad hoc arbitral tribunals are made up of privately-appointed arbitrators 
instead of tenured judges. In reviewing and adjudicating on states conducts vis-à-vis 
foreign investors, they apply private law rules and procedures. Similar to commercial 
arbitration, strict deference to principles of confidentiality and private autonomy 
precludes third parties including interest groups, civil society or local communities 
from having access to the arbitral proceedings.
26
 Whether the host state and the 
investor have already agreed on the applicable law or not, there is always leeway for 
the arbitral tribunal to draw on different interpretations in deciding the merits of the 
case. 
At this point, the paradox lies in how arbitral tribunals settle the tension between 
domestic and international law jurisdiction. How do they assess public and private 
law concerns; and how do they reach conclusions that reconcile equally the competing 
interests of both the foreign investor and the host state. In this chapter, I argue that the 
legal hybridity of ITA has two different phases that go hand-in-hand. It involves the 
interaction between domestic and international jurisdiction since investor-state 
disputes have been historically distributed among national courts, ad hoc tribunals and 
claim commissions. Yet, the advent of the ICSID has somehow shifted the scope of 
investor-state disputes from the host states domestic legal systems to the international 
investment regime. In addition, investment treaty disputes concern a dichotomy 
between public and private interests. That is to say, ITA decides on regulatory 
disputes between sovereign states and private investors or corporations. As such, 
                                                          
25
Id.  
26
Id. at 20   
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ICSID tribunals constitute an alternative private method of adjudication to the public 
law court system. In contravention of public law principles of sovereign independence 
and non-intervention, one-off private international tribunal reviews, evaluates and 
deters state authority from regulating its internal affairs in relation to foreign 
investors. I analyse the two phases of hybridity in the following two sections. 
A. THE HISTORICAL INTERPLAY BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
JURISDICTION 
In theory, investment treaty arbitration does not totally lie within the borders of 
international jurisdiction; rather it lies at the intersection between both domestic and 
international law. This is manifest in the parties, facts, rules and procedures of 
investor-state disputes. Participants in the given relationship belong to two different 
legal systems .i.e. the state as a subject of public international law and the foreign 
investor whether an individual or corporation as a subject of domestic law.
27
 When 
investors operate beyond their national borders, different legal regimes of hosting 
states govern their private international investment. Thus, there is always a question 
concerning which jurisdiction prevails. Does international law supersede domestic 
law or vice versa? Do both jurisdictions apply at the same time under certain 
limitations? The answer to these questions has never been the same; it constantly 
changes in so far as political, economic and legal contours governing international 
investment law change throughout history. In this section, I examine the evolution of 
investor-state disputes before and after the establishment of ICSID.  
1.   Calvo Doctrine: National Courts as “ex officio” Jurisdiction over 
Investment Disputes 
The current legal framework governing international investment law is an outcome of 
various historical, political and economic forces. The legal status of alius including 
foreign investors had been elevated from complete outlawry in the Middle Ages to 
national treatment in the modern era.
28
 It was not until the eighteenth and nineteenth 
                                                          
27
Id. at 2 
28
See, supra note 17 at 4  
10 
 
centuries that states recognized aliens‟ rights to travel, live and trade in foreign 
territories under non-discriminatory norms. The shift in the international practice 
concerning the protection of foreigners coincided with the process of Western 
commercial, political and military expansion in different regions, including Turkey, 
Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and other Central and Far Eastern Asian countries.
29
 Even 
though Western foreigners were relatively subject to the domestic laws of the host 
states, their properties were considered part of their home state's assets; and hence 
were organised under special legal regimes. Accordingly, any mistreatment of 
foreigners or expropriation of their properties in the host state constituted an injury to 
the latter's home state itself.
30
  
 
The correlation between foreigner‟s treatment abroad and the sovereignty of the home 
state had given rise to the principle of diplomatic protection in the course of 
transnational business. In 1924 the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
recognized states' right to exercise diplomatic protection over their nationals for an 
injury sustained as an elementary principle of international law.
31
 Although the 
exercise of diplomatic protection had taken different forms mainly claim commissions 
and ad hoc tribunals, coercive means of dispute settlement were frequently used by 
the powerful Western states. Throughout the colonial era, powerful countries 
exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction over their nationals and properties existing 
within colonised areas. In most cases, extraterritorial jurisdiction was exercised in the 
form of military intervention, annexation of territories, friendships, capitulation 
treaties or at best concession agreements.
32
 At the time, the use of force in the 
exercise of diplomatic protection was not contravening the essence of international 
law.
33
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In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, several attempts to ensure the 
pacific settlement of international disputes were carried out notably including the 
Hague Convention I of 1899 on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, the 
Hague Convention II of 1907 on the Limitations of the Employment of Force for the 
Recovery of Contract Debts and the 1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of 
War. However, the powerful colonial states had persisted in using all possible 
political, economic and military means to protect their interests abroad, impose 
diplomatic protection and coercively recover awards.
34
 The Western socio-political 
expansionism drove some states, particularly Latin American states,
35
 to adopt the 
Calvo Doctrine in respect to protection of foreign investment. The doctrine first 
emerged to resist the protective approach endorsed by the capital exporting countries 
for the protection of their nationals' properties abroad through the extraterritorial 
application of foreign regimes on host states.
36
  
 
The Calvo Doctrine is based on two essential principles: the absolute equality of 
foreigners with nationals and the non-intervention within the internal affairs of other 
states. According to the Argentinian jurist Carlos Calvo, the customary international 
law principle of sovereign equality entails that foreigners must not be entitled to a 
preferential standard of treatment other than the host state's nationals.
37
 The exercise 
of diplomatic protection in its different forms undermines the political independence 
and sovereign equality of the host state. Instead of the protective approach of 
jurisdiction, the Calvo doctrine laid down a territorial approach based on sovereign 
equality and national standard of treatment. Therefore, Calvo‟s territorial principle of 
jurisdiction recognizes the absolute right of host states to delineate the boundaries of 
their executive, legislative and judicial powers, decide on economic, social and 
cultural matters of national concern and enforce their domestic laws and regulations 
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35
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on everyone within their territorial borders. Nonetheless, visitors and non-national 
residents are variably excluded from certain rights and obligations inasmuch as the 
nationality requirements dictate, such as having the right to vote, paying public tax 
and enlisting in military service.
38
 
 
Although the Calvo doctrine somehow succeeded in curtailing the abuses of 
diplomatic protection through requiring the exhaustion of local remedies in host state, 
it has never been elevated to the rank of a customary international law principle.
39
 
State practice has clearly shown that the threat or the actual use of force remains a 
legal means of diplomatic protection in the event a host state refuses to adhere to 
arbitration or to enforce an award. Furthermore, powerful exporting countries 
persisted in claiming the right to exercise diplomatic protection in order to apply their 
laws to their nationals abroad.
40
 International jurisprudence on state responsibility for 
injuries to aliens recognizes both a minimum standard of treatment that is accepted by 
"civilized states" and satisfactory compensation in cases of expropriation of foreign 
properties.
41
 Yet, diplomatic protection under the Calvo's territorial approach cannot 
be invoked if any “available and effective local remedies” have not been exhausted 
before the host state domestic legal system.
42
  
2. The ICSID System: A Unique Jurisdiction for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes 
The rift between capital exporting and capital importing states over the minimum 
standards of treatment of foreign investment had widened during the process of 
decolonization post-World War II (WWII).
43
 The newly independent states fiercely 
claimed their right to either revise or annul the concession agreements that were 
signed under the colonial rule. Most of the decolonized states adopted a socialist 
economic approach towards private property in general and foreign investment in 
particular. A systematic process of nationalization had taken place to transfer foreign 
                                                          
38
See Vaughan Law, Jurisdiction, in M. Evans (Ed.), INTERNATIONAL LAW, 336-337 (2003) 
39
See supra note 17 at 13-14  
40
Id.  
41
“This minimum standard is essentially similar to standards of justice accepted by 'civilized states' 
including the European states and the US.”  
42
Id. 
43
 See supra note 17 at 18-24 
13 
 
private assets of the economy to the public ownership of the newly independent 
national state.
44
 Since 1938, states international responsibility to pay prompt and 
adequate compensation for direct expropriation of foreign private properties was well-
established under the Hull formula.
45
 However, in most instances, the process of 
nationalization was effectuated in accordance with national protectionist laws, and 
without appropriate compensation according to the Hall customary rule.
46
 In the same 
vein, on December 1962, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) passed 
Resolution no. 1803 on the "principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources". The resolution emphasizes the inherent right of states to permanent 
sovereignty over their natural resources; yet it asserts their international obligation to 
pay appropriate compensation for expropriation of foreign properties and private 
assets:
47
  
[N]ationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on 
grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest 
which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private 
interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall 
be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in 
force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its 
sovereignty and in accordance with international law.
48
 
  
As a result of this, capital exporting countries have shifted their rights-based language 
of private property and concession agreements to the notion of economic development 
to keep up with the new international reality. The flood of capital that accompanied 
the post-WWII reconstruction process stimulated a number of bilateral and 
multilateral treaties on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN).
49
 Although the 
promotion of trade and the protection of investment were the primary objects of such 
treaties, they also included provisions for economic development of the host states. In 
1958, the signing of the New York Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral 
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Awards (1958)
50
 marked a concrete step towards a transnational legal arrangement for 
the settlement of investment disputes.
51
 It paved the way for the establishment of the 
ICSID legal framework for investor-state arbitration in 1965. 
a. The ICSID as a Substitute for Two Divergent Dispute Resolution Systems, 
International Diplomatic Protection and Domestic Court System 
In the euphoria of decolonization, diplomatic protection, whether in its imperialistic 
orientation or its legal form including state-to-state diplomacy, claim commissions 
and ad hoc tribunals proved to be irresponsive to the nature of investment disputes.
52
 
On the one hand, the right to exercise diplomatic protection used to be within the 
absolute discretion of the investor‟s home state. Regardless of both the merits of the 
claim and the amount of economic loss, the exercise of diplomatic protection on 
behalf of foreign investment was entirely contingent on the political, economic and 
most notably the military considerations between the claiming state and the host 
state.
53
 Thus, foreign investors had no power to affect the claim-making process 
relying on the international responsibility of states for injuries to aliens, unless the 
home state so desired or a treaty/contract-based right to claim already existed.
54
  
 
On the other hand, the Calvo effect on the nascent jurisprudence of investment law 
has yielded the recognition of exhaustion of local remedies before national courts as a 
requirement for the exercise of diplomatic protection.
55
 In that sense, if foreign 
investors did not initially resort to domestic means of settlements in the host state, the 
international responsibility of the latter for injury to foreign nationals may not be 
invoked. Likewise, submission of investment disputes to the national legal systems of 
the host states was always problematic for foreign investors‟ interests.56 In many 
cases, such submission exposes the transnational private business to the risk of being 
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at the mercy of the socio-political clashes between states. Furthermore, it leads 
foreign investors towards immense legal uncertainty as they operate under different 
legal regimes. Such uncertainty is continuous in the sense that it begins the moment a 
business is first initiated abroad to the time a dispute may arise.
57
 In the latter case, 
foreign investors are in many events deprived of an access to impartial tribunal to 
settle upon their dispute. In fact, this is due to the lack of essential expertise to resolve 
cross-border investment disputes at the national level as well as the direct affiliation 
of national administrative and judicial arrangements to the governmental authority of 
the host state.
58
 The latter, being a part to the dispute
59
 renders domestic dispute 
resolution including national courts to fall far short of fairness and consequently 
become vulnerable to politicization.
60
 This tangled relationship between private 
international investment on the one hand, and host states on the other has highlighted 
the need for transnational governing arrangements at domestic, regional and 
international levels, particularly in the areas of dispute resolution.
61
  
 
In 1965, the establishment of the International Center for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) was a turning-point in the evolution of international investment 
law.
62
 It was first proposed by the World Bank to overcome the drawbacks of 
investment dispute settlement under both diplomatic protection and domestic court 
systems. ICSID provides a legal framework for the settlement of investment disputes 
arising between contracting states and investors who are nationals of other contracting 
states.
63
 It purportedly offers an impartial legal and institutional framework which 
aims for protecting transnational businesses as well as promoting economic 
development of the contracting states.
64
 For such common ends, ICSID delocalises 
investor-state disputes through making them subject only to the ICSID's resolution 
system. As soon as the parties consent to the ICSID jurisdiction, other local remedies 
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are supposed to be excluded,
65
 unless otherwise agreed by the parties.
66
 Once a claim 
is initiated before the ICSID, the investor‟s home state cannot exercise diplomatic 
protection, nor can the latter's national courts review or adjudicate the given dispute.
67
 
If the respondent state consents to the ICSID jurisdiction whether through treaty or 
contractual obligation, its consent cannot be withdrawn unilaterally
68
 or even 
conditioned on any additional requirements such as the exhaustion of local remedies 
before domestic arrangements, unless explicitly agreed by the parties.
69
 Practically 
speaking, this legal structure clearly transforms the scope of protection for private 
international investment from a mere privilege under diplomatic protection to a 
substantive right under the ICSID framework. 
b. The ICSID as an Exception to State Sovereign Immunity from 
Adjudication 
The ICSID Convention is a product of the reshaping of the international investment 
regime in the wake of the postcolonial upheavals. Developing states took advantage 
of their grander number in the United Nations (UN) to reconstruct the international 
rules on foreign investment on the basis of economic justice.
70
 Their collective effort 
under the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
71
 has 
shifted the focus of investment law towards international economic development.
72
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Capital-exporting states have departed from the language of private property to the 
protection of transnational investment as a means to economic development of states. 
This notion is evident in the very first paragraph of the ICSID Convention Preamble 
which reads: “Considering the need for international cooperation for economic 
development, and the role of private international investment therein.”73 Thus, the 
protection of foreign investment is no longer reduced to state responsibility for 
injuries to aliens on its territory, rather it becomes an object for promoting free trade 
and economic development among contracting states. This semantic evolution in the 
international investment regime has supposedly motivated most of developing states 
to ratify the ICSID convention with the aim of attracting Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) to their nascent economies.
74
  
 
Nevertheless, prima facie ratification is not sufficient for a host state to abide by the 
ICSID jurisdiction since the latter makes the agreement to arbitrate an investor-state 
dispute before its panels a parallel obligation.
75
 Theoretically, a contracting state‟s 
international responsibility may not be invoked unless it has formerly concluded 
B/MITs or an investment agreement that endorses the ICSID jurisdiction over future 
disputes with an investor of another contracting state.
76
 In that capacity, ITA acts as a 
unique adjudicative tool of public international law that governs the relationship 
between states and foreign investors through reviewing and adjudicating the former 
sovereign acts over its territory vis-à-vis foreign investors or corporations.
77
 
Therefore, ICSID does not tolerate arbitration unless the respondent state, as a 
sovereign party to the dispute, has in advance waived its sovereign immunity from 
adjudication. In this respect, ITA is genuinely distinguished from both commercial 
and contract-based investment arbitrations as they concern a state's private rather than 
public act within the international commercial sphere.
78
 This is due to the fact that 
state private acts under international commercial contracts are justiciable according to 
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the restrictive doctrine of state immunity.
79
 To the contrary, customary international 
law on sovereign independence of states renders states regulatory acts within their 
territorial borders immune from the international forms of adjudication.
80
 These 
regulatory acts encompass state executive, legislative and judicial conduct.
81
  
 
The fundamental plea of state immunity from suit extends either to foreign domestic 
courts of other states or international tribunals like that of the ICSID.
82
 Under 
customary international law, foras other than those of the state in whose territories the 
investment dispute arise are legally barred from reviewing the latter‟s public acts.83 
Although modern international practice has broadened the criteria upon which the 
waiver of state immunity from adjudication may be given, still "three substantial 
conditions" must be met for state consent to the ICSID jurisdiction.
84
 First, the 
consent to waive state immunity must be given directly by the beneficiary state itself, 
and not by any of its affiliated agencies; second, the consent must be explicit and 
unequivocal pursuant to an international treaty; third, the consent to waive state 
immunity from adjudication must not affect state immunity from execution or 
enforcement under international law.
85
 In fact, the distinction between the plea of state 
immunity from adjudication and that of execution or enforcement justifies the 
recognition of compensation as the only form of reparation under the ICSID 
Convention.
86
 The waiver of immunity from adjudication may be expressed by the 
respondent state either in the form of a self-standing offer contained in an 
international B/MIT or in a subsequent compromis d’arbitrage. Once given, ICSID 
claims its exclusive jurisdiction over an investment dispute; and hence the dispute 
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must be arbitrated without interference from any domestic political or judicial organs 
of either the host state or the home state. 
 
B. THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DICHOTOMY OF INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION  
In the ordinary course of events, states' regulatory disputes fall within the ambit of 
public law adjudication, i.e. domestic courts of law as part of the state governing 
authority. However, this is not the case with ITA where sovereign acts of states are 
adjudicated by ICSID's private international tribunals. In fact, ITA combines public 
and private law features into a single dispute resolution system. The mixed public-
private structure of ITA may be traced back to the evolution of the classical form of 
international arbitration from commercial transactions to regulatory conducts. Even 
though ITA is primarily formed by a public act of a state, it performs as a private 
model of adjudication. Unlike other form of international arbitration, it involves a 
regulatory relationship between a sovereign party – a host state – and a private party – 
a foreign investor.  
 
In practice, ITA reviews, assesses and adjudicates on states' regulatory conducts vis-à-
vis foreign investors' private interests. In this way, ITA has a dual effect on host 
states. In view of its high punitive damages, it offers foreign investors a coercive tool 
to deter host state's regulatory acts in relation to their private interests. Furthermore, it 
allows foreign investors a means to undermine prospective governmental policies 
through the threat of initiating arbitration proceedings. According to the UNCTAD, a 
large number of investor-state disputes have been amicably settled upon mutual 
compromises through out-of-court arrangements between foreign investors and host 
states.
87
 It has been reported that these settlements frequently involve drastic 
economic concessions given by respondent host states in return for ceasing arbitral 
proceedings.
88
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1. The Public Law Foundation: Investment Treaty Arbitration as 
Regulatory Adjudication 
The advent of the ICSID has strikingly extended the private model of international 
arbitration into the regulatory sphere. Despite the fact that the New York 
Convention
89
 and the UNCITRAL Model law on International Arbitration
90
 combined 
together the form of international arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution, its 
scope of application was confined only to commercial disputes between juridically-
equal parties.
91
 This embraces both state-to-state and private individuals/corporations 
disputes where the parties to the dispute have the same legal standing. Under classical 
international law, claims of international responsibility may only be brought among 
states as subjects of public international law.
92
 Even in cases where injuries are 
directed towards aliens, claims of international responsibility used to be initiated 
exclusively by the investor‟s home state against the host state through diplomatic 
channels.
93
  
Private individuals had no direct power in the claim-making process due to the lack of 
jurisdiction rationae personae under customary international law.
94
 Only sovereign 
states had discretion to claim international responsibility on behalf of their aliens 
abroad. It was not until the establishment of ICSID that individual investors and 
transnational corporations have been given direct access to international tribunals to 
initiate and enforce international claims in their own right against host states. Thus, 
ICSID has turned into a unique jurisdiction to private transnational investments. From 
this point, international investment arbitration transformed from reciprocal to 
regulatory relationship inter alia a sovereign state and a private 
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individual/corporation. These regulatory disputes were originally to be adjudicated by 
the host state's national courts in accordance with its municipal laws.
95
 
a. Analogy to Domestic Judicial review of Administrative Actions  
Van Harten and Loughlin aptly suggest that ITA offers an alternative dispute 
resolution system akin to domestic administrative courts of states.
96
 Indeed, article 1 
(2) of the ICSID convention is an embodiment of "global administrative law"; it states 
that “The purpose of the Centre shall be to provide facilities for conciliation and 
arbitration of investment disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other 
Contracting States in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.” The 
function of ITA under the ICSID legal framework in reviewing and adjudicating 
states' regulatory conduct vis-a-vis foreign investors is quite analogous to the 
domestic administrative courts of states.
97
 First and foremost, general consent of 
states to ICSID jurisdiction whether through investment contracts, national 
legislations or B/MITs, has converted ITA into a "compulsory adjudicative 
mechanism".
98
 Second, investors have the right to bring "direct individual claims" 
before ICSID tribunals, especially that they are not obliged in most cases by the 
customary limitation to exhaust local remedies in the host state.
99
 Third, since the 
procedural enforcement of the New York Convention has been extended to the 
Washington Convention, ICSID awards are legally enforceable vis-à-vis all state 
parties and not subject to any subsequent domestic or international supervision.
100
 
Finally and most seriously, ITA enables foreign investors to influence host state 
policy choices through threats of initiation of arbitral proceedings.
101
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This evolutionary shift from the reciprocal to the regulatory nature of disputes under 
the ICSID jurisdiction has brought about a broader jurisdiction rationae materaie in 
investment disputes. In this respect, article 25 (1) of the ICSID convention provides 
that “The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend [to any legal dispute] arising directly 
out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or 
agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of 
another Contracting State.” The logical corollary of this article is that the scope of 
application of ITA goes beyond the limits of private contractual relationships to cover 
all host state regulatory conducts that may negatively affect foreign investors over its 
territory.
102
 In contrast to commercial arbitration, ITA is not limited to private 
reciprocal disputes, rather it encompasses all governmental actions against foreign 
investors regardless of their private or public nature. 
 
b. ICSID Tribunals' Variable Scope of Review 
ICSID investment tribunal's scope of review is not the same in all case. It may vary 
depending on the nature of the legal instrument sanctioning investor-state arbitration. 
In this regard, three scenarios are contemplated. If the ICSID jurisdiction is triggered 
only by an investment contract where state consent is expressed by a private rather 
than a public act, the authority of the arbitral tribunal will be limited to such 
contractual relationship. In this case, the host state‟s exercise of public authority over 
the foreign investor will be assessed in light of the given contractual provisions.
103
 On 
a different account, if the ICSID jurisdiction is invoked through a sovereign act in the 
form of national legislation or international B/MIT (which is the focus of this study), 
the authority of the arbitral tribunal will be extended to cover all state public conducts 
vis-à-vis an investor regardless of their nature, whether public or private. In this event, 
the scope of reviewability of state conduct includes acts and omissions undertaken by 
any organ of the state irrespective of its functions, including executive, legislative and 
judicial organs.
104
 Finally, it is worth mentioning that in many events the ICSID 
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jurisdiction may be triggered through both private and public legal instruments; for 
example, a contracting state may sign an investment contract with a foreign investor 
with whom country it has already entered into a BIT. In this case, the investor's claim 
may be based on either contractual or treaty term violation or both of them. Therefore, 
the threshold of protection is far higher for such an investor since arbitral tribunals 
frequently draw on the more preferential terms for an investment. Further, some 
investment treaty tribunals elevate contractual provisions to the rank of treaty 
obligations.
105
  
2. The Private Law Foundation: Investment Treaty Arbitration as Private 
Model of Dispute Settlement 
Arbitration has long been used to settle commercial disputes arising between private 
parties. Since the early 1960s onwards, the practice of investor-state arbitration as an 
alternative method of dispute settlement has materialised under various international 
legal instruments;
106
 especially the European Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration (1961)
107
, the Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration (1975)
108
 and most notably the UNCITRAL model law on 
International Arbitration (1985).
109
 However, the scope of international arbitration 
under these legal instruments was entirely limited to commercial acts of states within 
the private law sphere. As a result, commercial arbitration was used in its classical 
form to review only a state commercial conduct within a given contractual 
relationship. The unusual function of ITA as a private law mechanism to resolve 
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regulatory disputes inter alia, the state and foreign investors, first emerged under the 
ICSID legal framework.
110
  
Under ICSID's framework, states consent to a private international regime for 
investment protection. By doing so, contracting states voluntarily grant foreign 
investors and transnational corporations the right to arbitrate, initiate and enforce 
international claims for injuries towards their assets or properties. A wide network of 
roughly 3,000 bilateral treaties incorporates states' self-standing consent to ICSID's 
private legal framework.
111
 To that effect, both commercial arbitration and ITA are 
initiated through an individual claim made by a private party. Analogous to 
international commercial arbitration, sovereign acts of a contracting state become 
subject to a private panel of contracted-arbitrators rather than a public law court 
system.
112
 Instead of a permanent court, one-off arbitral tribunals are in charge of 
investor-state disputes. Privately appointed arbitrators as a substitute for state-tenured 
judges undertake the process of settlement since the ICSID's Chair bestows 
comprehensive jurisdiction upon an arbitral panel to settle a specific dispute on a 
case-by-case basis.
113
  
 
Investment arbitration under the ICSID legal framework transplants rules of 
international commercial arbitration into regulatory disputes. On the one hand, ITA 
cherishes the principle of the confidentiality of proceedings, being at the heart of 
private law adjudication. This is evident in article 48 (5) of the ICSID Convention 
which provides that “The Centre shall not publish the award without the consent of 
the parties”. Since the ICSID is not authorized to publish arbitral awards without the 
consent of the concerned parties to the dispute, the latter may intend to block the legal 
reasoning of ITA for political or economic considerations. Although the 
overwhelming majority of ICSID decisions are published, It has been recently 
reported that there are some other anonymous arbitral decisions that never been 
reported due to the political sensitivity that surrounds investment disputes.
114
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In conformity with the commercial practice, ITA raises the principle of party 
autonomy over state sovereignty; hence the protection of transnational investment 
prevails over public policy considerations such as health, environment and social 
security. In practice, these considerations have nothing to do with the settlement of 
investor-state disputes.
115
 Therefore, third parties other than the state and the foreign 
investor including epistemic groups, civil society and local communities in the host 
state are absolutely precluded from joining arbitration proceedings.
116
 As to the legal 
remedy, ICSID recognizes compensation as the sole remedy in investor-state disputes. 
Despite the fact that compensation equally applies as a public law remedy in the event 
restitution seems to be impossible, it is still at the heart of private law remedies.
117
 
Further, awarded damages in investor-state disputes are recovered in accordance with 
the enforcement framework of international commercial arbitration under the New 
York Convention.
118
  
3. Investment Treaty Arbitration as a One-Sided System of Litigation  
The Preamble of the ICSID Convention states that “no Contracting State shall by the 
mere fact of its ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention and without its 
consent be deemed to be under any obligation to submit any particular dispute to 
conciliation or arbitration.”119 This provision was essentially formulated in deference 
to the contracting states' sovereign immunity from adjudication under international 
law. The Preamble is also supplemented by article 25 (1) which requires that the 
parties consent in writing to the ICSID jurisdiction.
120
 Indeed, states, as sovereign 
powers are at liberty to accept the ICSID jurisdiction depending on their legal, 
political and economic standing. Yet, the interplay between national and international 
jurisdiction along with the public-private structure that uniquely present in ITA has 
considerably reflected in the prospects of investment disputes under the ICSID.
121
  
                                                          
115
See supra note 2 at 141         
116
 Id.  
117
See supra note 20   
118
See supra note 2 at 139-140   
119
See supra note 1  
120
Id.  
121
See supra note 2    
26 
 
a. An Individualized Claim-Making Process 
Even though the ICSID Convention abstractly features both host states and foreign 
investors bringing arbitration requests against each other, only foreign investors have 
practical legal access to the ICSID litigation.
122
 In contrast to the reciprocal nature of 
typical international arbitration, the ICSID legal framework creates a one-sided 
system of international adjudication. Investor-state disputes constantly depict an 
investor whether an individual or a corporation filing a claim against a host state on 
the basis of an investment contract, an investment treaty or more commonly on both. 
This is not to suggest that the Convention does not anticipate the host state other than 
a respondent. Rather, the neoliberal mindset of the ICSID together with investment 
tribunals law-making have developed a one-sided body of law that only allows 
foreign investors to appear as claimant.
123
 Some private law practitioners have 
justified this biased model of the claim-making process by the fact that the host state, 
being sovereign, is the stronger party in investment disputes.
124
 It has comprehensive 
customary powers over its territory whether in relation to nationals or aliens.
125
 
Drawing on its political and economic influence, it may exercise unchecked 
regulatory powers against foreign investors.
126
 For this reason, foreign investment 
protection was the primary objective of the Washington Convention's drafters. 
Moreover, it may be argued that sovereign states have various domestic legal avenues 
of relief other than investment arbitration including domestic administrative and 
judicial arrangements; consequently, the host state may internally pursue legal 
proceedings on its own legitimate authority to have its rights sufficiently and 
expediently fulfilled.
127
  
 
On the contrary, I believe that it is the restrictive approach of most of arbitral tribunals 
rather than the conceptual framework of the ICSID that diminishes the host states' 
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substantive rights and accordingly gives rise to a biased claim-making process. 
ICSID's arbitral tribunals tend to question the conduct of the host state more than that 
of the investor regardless of the merits of the case. This inclination towards private 
international investment produces a one-sided avenue of relief that foregrounds the 
protection of foreign investment over public policy concerns of the host state; 
especially in health, environment and human rights matters.
128
 In doing so, investment 
tribunals employ an immense disciplinary influence over a state's legitimate 
regulatory power. No doubt, the need for substantive legal protection for transnational 
investment cannot be denied; yet, the right of the host state to counterclaim in an 
international venue must not to be disputed under any circumstance. In interpreting 
the parties' interests under ICSID's litigation, tribunals should account for the host 
state's substantive right to development as perceived by the Washington 
Convention.
129
 Further, they have to consider the state's countermeasure against 
serious breaches committed in the course of an investment.
130
 
 
In line with Van Harten's argument, I submit that the one-sided claim-making of ITA 
renders it close to pubic administrative law review. Although the consent to ICSID 
arbitration is no different than ordinary "offer and acceptance" in contract law, it 
varies considerably in the practice of ITA under the ICSID legal framework.
131
 Once 
a state has ratified the Washington Convention, its consent to ICSID jurisdiction may 
be extrapolated from different domestic and international legal instruments. This 
includes most notably a national legislation, investment contract or an international 
treaty. It is such consent that forms a state outstanding offer and consequently gives 
rise to recurrent arbitrations without legal privity.
132
 In Paulsson's view, this legal 
privity is twofold. For one thing, it means that a foreign investor whether individual or 
corporation, who is not a party to an international B/MIT with a host state, can avail 
himself/herself of the latter's protection as long as his/her home country is a party to 
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it.
133
 In this regard, the home state's international rights and obligation under the 
investment treaty are transferred to its aliens. Another thing relates to the rationae 
temoris of investment arbitration; that is "arbitration without privity" entails that even 
investments that did not exist at time a given B/MIT was concluded may become a 
subject of arbitration claims against the host state treaty party in the future.
134
 
Therefore, investor's claim ipso facto establishes a legal acceptance that perfects a 
host state self-standing offer to arbitrate included in a B/MIT. In all cases, ICSID's 
tribunals have the competence to settle in their own jurisdiction any preliminary 
objection made by either party to proceedings.
135
  
b. State Prospective Consent: 
ICSID's case law endorses broad criteria in recognizing states' consent to its 
jurisdiction. It draws on a variety of domestic and international legal instruments 
including investment contracts, national investment laws and international B/MITs to 
extract states' consent to ITA.
136
 In the case where a state's consent to ICSID 
arbitration is contained in either a clause compromissoire in an investment contract or 
a subsequent compromis d’arbitrage of an international treaty, the ICSID jurisdiction 
is explicit and consequently will be deduced easily by a given arbitral tribunal.
137
 
Such way of consent to ITA follows the exact means of consenting to traditional 
commercial arbitration. However, the difficulty lies in cases where the state's consent 
to ICSID arbitration is incorporated in either national legislation or B/MIT provision. 
Although the requirement of "written consent" is seemingly fulfilled in the form of a 
sovereign act whether a domestic law or an international treaty, the substance of 
states' consent to arbitration remains implicit. In the meantime, this sort of state 
consent constitutes the basis for the overwhelming majority of ICSID arbitrations 
particularly when a foreign investor invokes customary rules of international law 
applicable to the dispute such as Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) and Most 
Favored Nation (MFN). According to 2016 ICSID caseload statistics, nearly 70% of 
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investor-state disputes where the ICSID jurisdiction has been upheld were based on 
either national investment legislation of the host state or a BIT provision.
138
 
In the first scenario, a state unilateral act in the form of national investment legislation 
contains the state's self-standing consent to ITA. The landmark Pyramids case SPP v. 
Egypt
139
 marked such a development of state prospective consent.
140
 It was a turning 
point in the practice of international investment law to establish the consent to 
arbitration on a unilateral public act.
141
 Although Egypt as a party to the Washington 
Convention had not entered into an investment contract with Mr Siag, nor had it 
signed an ICSID arbitration agreement or compromis d’arbitrage, its binding consent 
to the ICSID was found in article (8) of its National Investment Law no. 43 of 
1974.
142
 While the arbitral tribunal held that SPP's consent is simply given through 
filling out the arbitration claim, it has concluded as to Egypt's consent that “although 
consent by written agreement is the usual method of submission to ICSID jurisdiction, 
it can now be considered as established and not requiring further reasoning that such 
consent can also be effected unilaterally by a contracting state.”143 In this case, the 
interaction between international and domestic jurisdiction is quite evident in 
establishing the ICSID jurisdiction. Whereas state consent was found in domestic 
legislation, investor‟s consent was effectuated by a private law act invested in the 
filling in of a written arbitration claim. In order to establish the ICSID jurisdiction, the 
tribunal had employed an expansive treaty interpretation in light of both domestic 
statutory provisions and international law that governs unilateral juridical acts.
144
  
In the second scenario, the state prospective consent to the ICSID jurisdiction is 
triggered only by a BIT clause. This sort of consent governs the current mainstream 
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practice of ITA under ICSID's case law. The (1990) AAPL v. Sri Lanka
145
 was the 
first case in which a state consent to ICSID arbitration has been solely found in a BIT. 
It marked a serious shift in the basis of states' consent to the ICSID. Up to that time, 
there had been few BITs compared to over the 3000 existing today.
146
 In an attempt to 
assert the private law foundation of ITA, the tribunal concluded that "the BIT per se 
does not contain the parties‟ agreement to arbitration; rather it contains the state offer 
of consent to arbitration which has been perfected by the investor‟s subsequent 
acceptance through filling an arbitration claim". Contrary to what stated by AAPL v. 
Sri Lanka, one can perceive a dichotomous process for extracting the parties' consent 
to arbitration in such a case. In this respect, the mixed Public-Private nature of ITA 
comes into play. The first step involves a public act represented by a BIT arbitration 
clause between the host state and the investor‟s national state which offers the host 
state consent; the second step involves a private act epitomized in the acceptance of 
the host state offer through filling in of an arbitration claim.
147
 Despite the fact that 
the language of the Sri Lanka-United Kingdom BIT is pretty conclusive in expressing 
the parties' consent to the ICSID jurisdiction,
148
 it contradicts article 25 of the 
Convention which requires a "written consent". This expansive approach in 
interpreting state‟s consent seems precarious in relation to the international principle 
of sovereign independence; yet, for others with a privately oriented mind-set, it is 
justified to some extent by the fact that ITA is a private international adjudicative 
mechanism (if that can even be said).  
Comparing the rationale of the two above-mentioned cases, it would be illogical if 
investment treaty tribunals decided that a state is able to give its consent to 
international arbitration through a unilateral municipal legislation, while few years 
later the latter is held powerless to do so pursuant to international legal instruments. 
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Nevertheless, this is not to justify these two expansive approaches in extrapolating a 
state consent to ITA, nor to suggest that all BITs intrinsically serve as a state‟s 
prospective consent to arbitration. There are still numerous BITs that contain instead 
an ICSID arbitration clause explicitly requiring subsequent compromis d’arbitrage 
between the parties. This narrow scope of interpretation did in fact prevail at the time 
the convention was signed. ICSID's drafters themselves have incorporated such 
approach of interpretation of state consent into the Convention Preamble and again in 
article 25 (1).
149
 Despite the fact that a broad scope of interpretation to state consent is 
in the foreign investor‟s best interest, it conversely brings up immense legal 
uncertainty to the host state.
150
 Indeed, ITA is designed in the first place to protect 
transnational investment as the weaker party over host state's territory, yet state 
"subsequent written consent" to an international regulatory adjudication serves as a 
guarantee for its sovereign independence. 
C. CONCLUSION: 
In this chapter, I have explored the legal evolution of ITA from two different yet 
interrelated dimensions: domestic and international jurisdiction and public and private 
law. In section one, I have demonstrated how investor-state disputes do not lie in full 
within the ambit of international law, rather they lie at the intersection between 
domestic and international laws. The governing regime of investment disputes has 
changed in so far as political, economic and legal contours of international investment 
law evolved throughout history. Diplomatic protection proved to be irresponsive to 
the nature of investment disputes; the notorious forms in which it was exercised by 
the powerful exporting states have undermined the host states political independence 
and sovereign equality. Although the Calvo Doctrine has partially succeeded in 
curtailing the abuse of diplomatic protection through requiring the exhaustion of local 
remedies in respondent states, it has never been elevated to the status of customary 
international law. Likewise, deciding investment disputes through national court 
systems puts private transnational business at risk of being denied justice or facing 
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unspecialized or unfair domestic arrangements. It further exposes foreign investor's 
interests to underlying socio-political clashes between states.  
In section two, I have explained how the mixed public-private structure of ITA is 
traced back to the evolution of the classical international arbitration from the 
reciprocal relationship in "commercial transactions" to the regulatory relationship in 
investor-state disputes. While ITA is primarily formed by a public act of a state, it 
performs as a private model of dispute settlement under the ICSID. On the domestic 
level, a state may consent to international investment arbitration through enacting 
domestic investment legislation that allows arbitration in future disputes with 
prospective foreign investors operating on its territories. On the international level, a 
state may conclude B/MITs or join FTAs which provide for investment arbitration 
before ICSID tribunals. In reviewing states' regulatory conduct vis-a-vis foreign 
investors, I have analogized the function of ITA to the domestic judicial review of 
administrative actions. In that sense, the ICSID legal framework constitutes an 
alternative private method of adjudication to the public law court system; 
nevertheless, investment treaty tribunals apply private law rules that originate in the 
practice of international commercial arbitration.  
 
In contrast to the reciprocal nature of typical international arbitration, the ICSID legal 
framework creates a one-sided system of litigation that perceives investors only as 
claimants. A one-off private international tribunal reviews, evaluates and adjudicates 
state authority to regulate its internal affairs of public policy vis-a-vis foreign 
investors. A considerable amount of case law shows broad criteria in recognizing 
states consent to ICSID jurisdiction. Investment treaty tribunals draw on a variety of 
domestic and international legal instruments to extract the contracting state consent to 
arbitration. In sum, I argued that ITA combines the form and procedures of 
international commercial arbitration, yet it performs under the substantive principles 
of public law. In fact, regulatory disputes that govern the relationship between states 
and private individuals essentially require the incorporation of public rather than 
private law standards of review. Since ITA is formed by a sovereign act of a state by 
which the latter voluntary waives its sovereign immunity from adjudication, it must 
legally be reviewed as public law adjudication.  
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III. PRIVATIZING INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: 
ELEVATING INVESTMENT PROTECTION OVER STATE 
REGULATORY POWER 
The legitimacy of the current network of ITA under the ICSID legal framework is 
believed to be at stake.
151
 In addition to the precarious basis of consent to the ICSID 
jurisdiction, as discussed in chapter one, the ICSID's neoliberal philosophy has 
bolstered expansive interpretations of investment treaties at the expense of host state 
regulatory power. This is due to the absence of a comprehensive legal framework that 
balances equally between the interests of investors and host-states, accounts for the 
economic disparities between developed and developing countries and clearly sets up 
the limits between investment protection and state regulatory functions.
152
 Whereas 
the developed countries, being representatives of mainstream transnational business, 
have long sought to maximize the scope of protection in favor of foreign investors, 
developing countries strove for FDI flows side-by-side with securing their national 
policies.
153
 Even though most of Investor-state arbitrations are concluded under the 
legal framework of the ICSID, interpretations of central investment provisions 
included therein have proven to be volatile and hence vulnerable to change on a case-
by-case basis.
154
 This applies particularly with respect to the scope of minimum 
standards of treatment including Most Favored Nation (MFN), Fair and Equitable 
Treatment (FET), definition of protected investment, concept of indirect 
expropriation, limits of investment guarantees in host state and provisions on 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) concerning health, environment, labor and 
taxation.
155
  
International investment law has become plagued with uncertainty and fragmentation. 
ICSID's neoliberal foundation has persisted in privatizing international investment 
law through the broad law-making power of commercial arbitrators and private 
international law firms.
156
 The legal framework of the Washington Convention 
establishing the ICSID was vehemently criticized by a large number of academics and 
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practitioners in the field for favoring inflexible investment protection to the detriment 
of the host states‟ socio-economic scheme.157 Some scholars have attributed the 
fragmentation of the international investment regime to the variation in treaty terms, 
negotiating powers and the quality of legal expertise based on a state's political and 
economic level of development.
158
 On the other side, the lack of a binding precedent 
to govern the practice of ITA as well as an effective mechanism to review and correct 
potential legal errors has largely generated many conflicting arbitral awards.
159
 Over 
the past two decades, innumerable arbitral awards worth billions of dollars have been 
rendered against middle and low-income states.
160
 The divergent practice of ITA has 
ultimately folded into two principal solutions; namely, either to amend the 
Washington Convention in order to accommodate host states' right to regulate along 
with investment protection or to renegotiate a Multilateral Agreement on Foreign 
Investment (MAI) to fairly considers the host states public law concerns. 
Nevertheless, differences between developed and developing countries over both the 
scope of the minimum standards of investment protection and the limits of states' 
regulatory space have hindered any amendment to the Washington Convention.
161
  
The failure of negotiations on a MAI to replace the current diverse network of BITs 
has maintained the imprudent interpretations of ICSID investment treaty tribunals. 
Moreover, applying extreme neoliberal policies has proven to be risky amid arduous 
economic crises. Even developed countries have been forced to rethink their free 
marked-based ideals for the sake of economic salvation and social security protection. 
States practice' has witnessed a shift towards creating a safe space for exercising 
regulatory power over economic functioning. Therefore, investment treaty tribunals 
cannot further tolerate interpretations which are no longer supported by state practice. 
The rising discrepancy among ICSID arbitral panels has led some developing 
countries to renegotiate their BIT provisions on much stricter terms to be in line with 
domestic social and economic policies. This tendency is evident in the practice of 
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many middle and high-income developing states, especially with regards to financial, 
labor, health and environmental fields of function.
162
 Other countries have managed to 
initially limit their consent to the ICSID jurisdiction to avoid unpredictable claims.
163
 
A third category of states have taken an extremist attitude towards ITA and decided to 
opt out of the ICSID
164
 system altogether, rescind their investment treaties
165
 or to 
challenge the ICSID arbitral awards through the available annulment procedures.
166
 
A. INTER-STATE BARGAIN OF AN INVESTMENT TREATY: DOES VARIATION IN 
TREATY TERMS ACCOUNT FOR FRAGMENTATION OF INVESTMENT TREATY 
ARBITRATION 
Until the end of WWII, investment protection was subject to the power and 
persuasion of states. The scope of protection for foreign investment was mainly 
dependent on the political, economic and military influence of either the host state or 
the investor‟s home state.167 In the wake of the postcolonial era, the schism between 
capital-exporting and capital-importing countries over the minimum standards of 
treatment for foreign investment forced the former to negotiate comprehensive BITs 
so as to secure long-established interests over the latter‟s territories.168 Above all, 
having a minimum standard of protection for foreign investment was a prerequisite 
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for developed states to deploy more assets in the newly independent states. A salient 
part of the literature on investment arbitration supports the view that term variations 
over a diverse network of BITs have yielded an increasing number of inconsistent 
arbitral awards and consequently accounts for fragmentation of the system at large.
169
 
In this regard, I explain how bilateral investment treaties have developed an 
overarching regime for the protection of private international investment. Further, I 
evaluate the divergent approaches of investment treaty tribunals to the minimum 
standards of treatment that included in different bilateral investment treaties. 
1. Bilateral Investment Treaties as a Normative Basis for International 
Investment Regime   
It was in the best interest of capital-exporting countries representing mainstream 
transnational investment to establish a hegemonic model of investment protection.
170
 
Under the neoliberal philosophy, bilateral treaties were seen as a substitute for both 
the deceased gun-boat diplomacy and the implausible multilateral treaty on 
transnational investment. This interest corresponded to the capital-importing 
countries' aim to attract FDI essential for economic development.
171
 For such an end, 
the latter were keen to convey positive messages to the former through entering into 
comprehensive bilateral investment treaties.
 
 
In fact, these matching interests explain why BITs have historically developed in an 
adverse order between developed and developing countries. On the other side, the 
New International Economic Order Declaration (NIEO) has reinforced South-South 
economic cooperation leading to the conclusion of numerous BITs among capital-
importing countries themselves.
172
 Oil explorations in North Africa and the Middle 
East have driven many developing countries to sign BITs to assist their nascent oil 
inter-trade.
173
 Besides, the industrial boom in South Eastern Asia has witnessed a 
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significant diffusion of BITs amongst Far Eastern developing countries in order to 
facilitate manufacture and technology transfer.
174
  
All these factors have resulted in a considerable increase in the number of BITs 
concluded between developing states from only 42 BITs in 1990 to over 1000 BITs in 
force today.
175
 Being relatively recent, most of BITs concluded between developing 
states were initially guided by the capital-exporting countries model investment 
treaties. In particular, the U.S. was and still playing a prominent role in developing a 
body of laws through updated model BITs.
176
 Thus, the interest in uniform rules on 
investment protection came up along with neoliberal views that lead private 
transnational businesses to gain access to domestic markets.  
Over the time, there have been changes in BIT terms upon individual limitations. 
Some states have adapted investment treaty language to their social, political and 
cultural identity. Yet, such changes in BIT terms were always concerned with 
generalities rather than details of minimum standards for investment protection.
177
 
Thus, the continuing attempts to conclude a multilateral investment treaty have failed 
because of the differences over the exceptions and not the principles of investment 
protection.
178
 Arbitral tribunals have eventually decided on the substantive rights and 
obligations of either party through interpretation. Nevertheless, the scope of 
interpretation the tribunal may exert increases or decreases depending on the degree 
of clarity and flexibility of treaty language.
179
  
Although the treaty parties create their own investment treaty law, arbitral tribunals 
are the supreme interpreters of when and how treaty term applies. Once the parties 
recognize an investment treaty, they impliedly delegate comprehensive interpretive 
power to the prospective arbitral tribunal. In that capacity, investment treaty tribunals 
replace treaty parties as law-maker for the given investment treaty. In asserting its 
law-making function, the tribunal in Sempra Energy International v. Argentine 
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concluded that it has the exclusive competence to interpret the meaning of BIT terms 
upon which it was entitled by the parties to settle the given dispute.
180
  
Theoretically, arbitral tribunals as consensual adjudicative mechanisms are not 
formally bound by the judicial rule of stare decisis.
181
 Even though arbitral awards are 
not given the status of formal precedent, they are frequently relied on by investment 
treaty tribunals. In practice, the use of precedent creates a body of case law that 
applies independently from the governing treaty provisions.
182
 Even so, investment 
treaty tribunals have in many occasions deviated from well-established precedents 
drawing on certain legal reasoning underlying the tribunal‟s conviction instead of 
treaty term variations.
183
  
Before the advent of the ICSID, investment treaties provided at most for state-to-state 
arbitration as an alternative to diplomatic protection.
184
 At that time investment 
arbitration claims had not been individualized yet. Only states were parties to 
international investment arbitrations. Dispute resolution was exercised through 
submitting a treaty claim by a state party to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), an 
arbitral tribunal or ad hoc committee.
185
 Even after the emergence of the 
individualized version of investment arbitration for the first time under the legal 
framework of the Washington Convention, the ICSID jurisdiction had to be built on a 
pre-existing investment contract inter alia, a foreign investor and a host state.
186
  
It was not until the AAPL v. Sri Lanka award in 1990 that the pervasive network of 
BITs became a comprehensive source of states' consent in investor-state treaty-based 
arbitrations.
187
 In that way, customary international law on both lex merchatoria as 
well as state responsibility for injuries to aliens was reflected in a vast network of 
bilateral, multilateral and free trade agreements.
188
 In fact, this network forms the 
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modern bulk of international law on foreign investment. It is impliedly understood 
from article 42 of the ICSID Convention that BITs constitute the primary source of 
international law on the protection of foreign investment against non-commercial 
risks.
189
 
2. Divergent Interpretations of International Minimum Standards of 
Treatment 
One may suggest that quid pro quo bargains and relative negotiating powers of treaty 
parties underlying the concept of BITs render the latter essentially variable in content 
and structure. While some BITs may require negotiations between treaty parties, 
exhaustion of local remedies or expiration of a grace period prior to submitting 
arbitration claim, others may not require any prerequisites.
190
 Undeniably, BITs are 
not identical, yet they form an overarching body of international standards governing 
foreign investment.191 BITs have developed a striking convergent structure whether in 
terms of language or objectives which advance the promotion and protection of 
private transnational investment and the economic development of the host states.
192
 
Drawing on standardized treaty terms, they typically contain provisions on non-
discrimination, prohibition of direct and indirect expropriation, Most Favored Nation 
(MFN), Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET), Free Transfer of Capital (FTC) and most 
importantly arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution.
193
  
Even when it comes to almost identical BIT terms, some arbitral tribunals have not 
arrived at consistent legal reasoning. For instance, in CME Czech Republic B.V v. the 
Czech Republic & Ronald S. Lauder v. the Czech Republic, despite the fact that both 
tribunals were deciding on the same facts and merits under the same applicable 
arbitration rules, they reached different interpretations of compensatory expropriation. 
Whereas the former holds the Czech Republic liable for approximately U.S $ 270 
                                                          
189
See supra note 1  
190
See supra note 173 at 20-22      
191
See STEPHAN W. SCHILL, MULTILATERIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, 65-67 (2
nd
 
edition, Cambridge University Press) (2009)  
192
Id.  
193
See supra note 173  
40 
 
million in damage for breach to the Czech Republic-Netherlands BIT,
194
 the latter 
awarded no damages for lack of unlawful expropriatory activity under the Czech 
Republic-United States BIT.
195
 Likewise, the question rises before arbitral tribunals 
with respect to the application the “Umbrella Clause” in some BITs, and whether it 
elevates a contractual breach to the level of a treaty violation. Two ICSID panels have 
divergently applied the umbrella clause, despite clear textual similarity in the given 
BITs.
196 The tribunal in SGS v. Philippines upheld jurisdiction over the dispute on the 
grounds that the Philippines contractual obligation to observe undertakings which 
were entered into with SGS at the time the latter has first commenced its investment is 
essentially covered by the treaty umbrella clause.
197
 In contrast, the tribunal in Salini 
v. Jordan found that the umbrella clause does not apply to Jordan‟s contractual claim 
at issue, and accordingly the tribunal dismissed jurisdiction over the claim.
198
  
From international law perspective, BITs develop a normative basis for international 
minimum standards of treatment. As Stephan Schill argues, they usher in an era of 
multilateralized investment protection for private international investment.
199
 The 
Most Favoured Nation Clause (MFN) as one of the key standards governing 
investment protection provides the clearest example in this respect. The MFN clause 
is frequently incorporated in most bilateral, multilateral, regional and sectorial 
investment treaties in an unconditional and reciprocal form.
200
 The existence of MFN 
clause in a BIT automatically extends the host state beneficial treatment that may be 
given to third parties to the party of such BIT, particularly if the latter is treated less 
favourably by the host state. Therefore, MFN clause does not only apply the 
minimum standards for investment protection in a normative manner, but also 
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multilateralize the access to BITs beneficial terms by foreign investor/investment.
201
 
Nevertheless, jurisprudence on ITA shows divergent approaches to the application of 
the MFN clause. This is manifest in the two ICSID conflicting awards, Maffezini v. 
Spain and Palma v. Bulgaria.
202
 Whereas the Maffezini tribunal allowed the investor 
to benefit from a more favorable dispute resolution system under the Spain-Chile 
BIT,
203
 the Palma tribunal, relying on a restrictive approach to treaty terms, rejected 
to extend the application of the MFA clause in the Cyprus-Bulgaria BIT concerning 
the dispute resolution clause to the other Bulgarian BIT.
204
  
Moreover, the concept of "Corporate Structuring" similarly exemplifies the 
multilaterization of international investment law through BITs. Corporate structuring 
allows foreign investors to avail themselves of the protective regime of a third party 
investment treaty.
205
 In the total absence of an investment treaty between the host 
state and the investor‟s home state, ITA can be invoked under the ICSID jurisdiction 
if the intended investor establishes an affiliation or subsidiary of his investment in a 
third state which has already entered into an investment treaty with the respondent 
host state.
206
 In fact, both the MFN clause and the corporate structuring best epitomize 
the "depoliticization" of investor-state disputes through eliminating the state-to-state 
power equation from the settlement process as central argument for the establishment 
of the ICSID.
207
 I argue that the ICSID private law inclination inherently supports 
legal solutions that mostly fit into the nature and structure of private transnational 
investment rather than host states' regulatory functions.
208
 It is the arbitral tribunals‟ 
variable interpretations of key investment provisions rather than the variation in BIT 
terms themselves that have brought about the “fragmentation” in the international 
investment regime at large. Even though one can easily note variations among BIT 
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terms, the effect of the latter has proven to be secondary to investment treaty tribunals' 
interpretations in predicting outcomes of investor-state disputes.  
B. AN ASYMMETRIC BASIS OF JURISDICTION UNDER THE ICSID LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 
Since the early 1990s, the growing number of BITs has formed the modern body of 
international law on foreign investment. International minimum standards of 
treatment have shifted from customary rules to treaty-based law. Yet, the deep 
private-law-oriented framework of the ICSID has resulted in a diffusion of ITAs 
through direct individualized claims.
209
 Paradoxically, neither the Preamble of the 
ICSID Convention, nor do its conventional terms provide a comprehensive definition 
of the "protected investment". Although the very first paragraph of the Preamble 
clearly associates private international investment with the contracting states' 
economic development, it does not elaborate on such association for the purpose of 
ICSID's mainline jurisdiction. Thus, the convention leaves the matter of determining 
the ICSID jurisdiction rationae materaie to the given B/MITs as a first guess and the 
interpretation of the intended investment treaty tribunal as a second guess. In light of 
the vaguely drafted BIT terms, arbitrators have taken an expansive approach in 
deciding what is qualified as a protected investment under the ICSID legal 
framework.
210
  
On the other hand, the ICSID jurisdictional basis rationae persona maintains a 
normative legal order that favours Multinational Corporations (MNCs) whether on the 
international or the domestic level.
211
 Considering the ICSID's costly proceedings, 
developed countries' investors have a smooth access to its facilities and consequently 
better chances of victory over developing countries' investors.
212
 In addition, domestic 
investors and corporations are denied access to the ICSID for lacking jurisdiction 
rationae personae under the latter's framework. They are deprived of any substantive 
                                                          
209
 See supra note 17 
210
 See supra note 8 
211
 See supra note 103 at 4 
212
 See Stavros Brekoulakis, Systemic Bias and the Institution of International Arbitration: A 
New Approach to Arbitral Decision-Making, 5 Int‟l. Dispute Settlement J. 553 (2013)  
43 
 
legal protection on an equal footing with their foreign counterparts. As a result of that, 
domestic investors are double-burdened under the ICSID legal framework. First, they 
are entitled to a less preferential treatment than foreign investors and corporations. 
Second, they do not have the choice to overshoot bureaucratic administrative and 
judicial procedures to an alternative dispute settlement.  
1. Undefined Protected Investment: Investments Are Not Alike 
For the purpose of the Washington Convention, an investment establishes the 
jurisdiction rationae materaie of the ICSID. However, the Convention does not 
provide a definition of "protected investment". As a threshold jurisdictional issue, 
investment treaty tribunals have to primarily decide whether the substance of the 
claim qualifies as an investment in the meaning of the Washington Convention as 
well as the relevant B/MIT.
213
 Even though the Preamble of the ICSID does not 
comprehensively define protected investment, it emphasizes the relationship between 
the investment and the economic development of contracting host states. It reads as 
follows: "Considering the need for international cooperation for economic 
development, and the role of private international investment therein; bearing in mind 
the possibility that from time to time disputes may arise in connection with such 
investment between Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States."
214
 
Thus, the Preamble requires that an investment contributes to the host state's 
economic development in order to qualify as protected under the ICSID framework. 
On the conventional level, chapter two of the convention entitled "jurisdiction of the 
centre" does not assist at all in defining an investment. In this regard, article 25 (1) 
states that "The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising 
directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent 
subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) 
and a national of another Contracting State."
215
 This provision provides a broad 
definition of protected investment, and hence transfers the burden of defining the 
latter to the B/MITs on which the parties agree.  
                                                          
213
 See CAMPBELL M. ET AL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES,  
163-64 (1
st
 edition, Oxford University Press (2008) 
214
See supra note 1  
215
Id.  
44 
 
Christoph Schreuer traces this jurisdictional lacuna whether partially in the Preamble 
or fully in article 25 to the contracting parties contradicting views reflected in the 
convention travaux preparatoires on the definition of protected investment.
216
 In spite 
of the fact that the parameters set forth in most BITs on what constitutes an 
investment are frequently similar, if not identical in term and content, they often 
provide general conditions for qualifying an investment.
217
 This lack calls on 
investment treaty tribunals to draw on customary rules of interpretation to define an 
investment under the ICSID. In doing so, they have to essentially consider the ICSID 
preamblar limitation as well as the BIT terms in question.
218
 To the contrary, 
investment arbitration jurisprudence denotes divergent approaches in deciding what 
qualifies as protected investment. Investment treaty tribunals have broadly expanded 
their law-making authority relying on the well-established procedural rule as 
stipulated literally in article 41 of the Convention that "the tribunal shall be the judge 
of its competence."
219
 Whereas some tribunals adopted an integrationist approach in 
defining investment, others applied a restrictive definition to the preamblar text and 
ignored the requirement on the contribution to the host state's economic development.    
The practice of most arbitral tribunals is laid down by the earliest award Fedax NV v. 
Republic of Venezuela (1998).
220
 The substance of the claim concerned promissory 
notes signed by Venezuela and endorsed to Fedax. The tribunal accepted the 
Venezuelan argument that Fedax had not made any foreign direct investment in 
Venezuela and that it had indirectly acquired such promissory notes by way of a third 
party endorsement. The tribunal upheld Venezuela's defense and dismissed the claim 
for lack of direct investment made towards the host state's economic development.
221
 
Four years later, by the same token the tribunal in Salini v. Morocco drew on an 
integrationist approach of an investment,
222
 and further required an investment to have 
four essential elements: a contribution of money or assets; a fixed duration; an 
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element of risk; and a contribution to the host state‟s economic development.223 
Clearly, the objective test in both Fedax and Salini is consistent with the customary 
rules of international law under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT). In emphasizing the importance of the object and purpose under article 31 (1) 
of the VCLT, the tribunal in Saluka concludes that "The protection of foreign 
investments is not the sole aim of the treaty, but rather a necessary element alongside 
the [overall aim] of encouraging foreign investment and extending and intensifying 
the parties' economic relations."
224
 In Saluka, the tribunal not only acknowledges the 
relationship between investment protection and the host state's level of economic 
development, but also uplifts the latter as the "overall aim" of such a relationship. 
Nevertheless, more recent investment jurisprudence denotes dissenting practice by 
other investment treaty tribunals. In Victor Pey Casado & President Allende 
Foundation v. The Republic of Chile,
225
 although the Tribunal referred to the four-part 
test in qualifying an investment, it did not fully apply the latter.
226
 Indicating 
ostensible deference to the VCLT interpretive guidelines, the tribunal argued that the 
ICSID preamblar requirement on the contribution of an investment to the host state's 
economic development is not an ipso facto condition for qualifying an investment; 
rather it is a potential outcome of an investment. Accordingly, the Tribunal filtered 
out the definition of investment from the fourth condition.
227
 More extreme words 
were used by the Quiborax v. Bolivia tribunal in rejecting both Fedax and Salini 
integrationist approach.
228
 In that meaning, the Quiborax tribunal concludes that “It is 
true that the Preamble to the ICSID Convention mentions contribution to the 
economic development of the host State. However, this reference is presented as a 
consequence and not as a condition of the investment.”229   
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In my view, both Victor Pey and Quiborax tribunals flagrantly contradict customary 
international law rules of interpretation as stipulated in articles 31 and 32 of the 
VCLT which explicitly qualify the Preamble and the annexes as inherent parts of the 
treaty text for the purposes of interpretation. Dissenting tribunals endorse a restrictive 
approach that relies on mere textual meaning while ignores the object and purpose of 
the treaty as embodied in the Preamble. The Convention travaux preparatoires 
unequivocally show that developing states, in particular, first joined the ICSID with 
the primary aim to withstand economic challenges and attract FDI flows for the sake 
of economic development and public welfare.
230
 For such an end, states voluntarily 
authorize foreign investments penetration into areas of public policy, entitle them to 
minimum standards of treatment and waive their sovereign immunity from 
adjudication so as to allow for alternative means of dispute settlement. In return for 
this, foreign investment should abide by the host state's laws and regulations and 
make substantial contribution in terms of value-added to the host state's economic 
development.
231
   
2. Unequal Access to ICSID Tribunals: Multinational Investment versus 
Domestic Investment 
Modern international investment law has freed foreign investors from their home 
state‟s discretion to exercise diplomatic protection through the individualized form of 
claims.
232
 Yet, access to ITA under the current legal framework of the ICSID has 
proven to be problematic for many investors whether on the international or domestic 
levels. Several studies have criticized the scope of the ICSID jurisdiction rationae 
personae as it only enables Multinational Corporations (MNCs) easy access to ITA.
233
  
On the other hand, lesser concerns in the relevant literature, though significant in my 
view, have been raised over excluding domestic investors from the international 
minimum standards of treatment under the ICSID. I argue that this jurisdictional 
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deficit strongly contravenes the well-established public law principles of procedural 
fairness and equality which dictate that all parties to a given dispute must be granted 
legal protection on an equal footing. 
a. Favouring Multinational Corporations over Individual Investors  
Some commentators maintain that MNCs enjoy smooth access and better chances of 
victory under the ICSID legal framework.
234
 The high degree of legal sophistication 
and procedural complexity in the ICSID dispute resolution system places many 
hurdles in front of the respondent developing states as well as their investors. In fact, 
ICSID litigation requires the competing parties – corporations, individual investors 
and host states – to be well-advised by reliable legal arbitrators, counsels and experts 
throughout the proceedings.
235
 The respondent state has to have the adequate 
analytical tools and econometric studies to assess its domestic investment policies in 
light of the relevant international minimum standard of treatment. These instruments 
are quintessential in either proving or disproving the negative impact on a given 
foreign investment.
236
  
 
Aside from legal expertise, developing states are double-burdened by the ICSID 
lengthy proceedings that often last for years.
237
 Undoubtedly, the financial standing of 
investment treaty parties may be reflected on the prospects of ITA. While developed 
states endeavor to secure transnational protection for their MNCs, developing states 
enter into BITs to primarily attract FDI to their modest economies. Thus, the latter 
accept the former's standardized investment provisions on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis.
238
 Given the potential for large damages under the ICSID litigation, one may 
suggest that ITA is a precarious dispute resolution system for developing countries. 
The situation may be even worse if we consider the fact that the financial resources of 
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some MNCs exceed the total GDP of some low and middle-income contracting states 
of the ICSID.
239
 
 
Recent empirical findings clearly support the view that the ICSID dispute resolution 
system favours MNCs over developing host states. While low and middle-income 
developing countries' share from Global FDI is around 10%, they are respondents in 
the overwhelming majority of ITAs.
240
 According to the 2016 ICSID caseload 
statistics, developing states have been involved in more than 70% of the total number 
of investor-state arbitrations registered before the ICSID since 1972.
241
 Furthermore, 
geographic distribution of cases surprisingly reveals that North American and 
Western European states have been respondents in only 11 % of the ICSID investor-
state disputes, while South American, African, and Middle Eastern Countries have 
been subjected to roughly 50% of disputes.
242
 
 
As a result of this private law inclination towards MNCs, the developing host states' 
socio-economic rights appear to be severely undermined under the ICSID legal 
framework for the sack of investment protection. In this regard, the 2010 UNCTAD 
database on ITA reveals that the American-based MNCs are the most likely to take 
developing states to ITA before ICSID tribunals; as the number of claims filed by 
MNCs against developing host-states reached 93 claims compared to only 12 claims 
filed by developing-states' corporations against the US.
243
 These data together with 
the fact that the US share of global FDI exceeds the wholesale shares of the low and 
middle income developing countries demonstrates that the developed states' MNCs 
                                                          
239
 See YEN, TRINH HAI. INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION IN PRACTICE: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
INVESTMENT TREATIES 321 (1
st
 edition, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) (2014); (for example, in the 
course of litigations that were triggered after its economic crisis, Argentine had to pay a total amount of 
damages that fairly exceeds its entire annual budget. Also, Pakistan was entitled to pay damages 
equivalent to total national reserve as a result of a chain of investment arbitrations.) 
240
 See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, (December 14, 1960),  available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ 
241
 See supra note 138 available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Pages/ICSID-Caseload-Statistics.aspx  
242
Id. 
243
 UNCTAD, Database of Treaty-Based Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases. (2010). available at 
http://www.unctad.org/iia-dbcases/cases.aspx?col_aa=show 
49 
 
enjoy a better legal standing under the ICSID framework than those of developed 
counties do.
244
   
 
Even though the ICSID bolsters the penetration of MNCs into public law matters such 
as health, environment and taxation, it does not provide for relevant rules on corporate 
social responsibility. Further, it does not even allow access to its proceedings by the 
host state‟s affected individuals or groups.245 Oddly enough, an investor who seeks 
fair and equitable treatment in the host state cannot be held accountable by the latter 
for his transgression against the host state‟s population.246 Nevertheless, international 
efforts have been made to bring corporate conduct under the rule of law.
247
 The NIEO 
Declaration has moved to develop international law rules on corporate social 
responsibility that consider host states' sovereign independence in the course of 
transnational investment operations.
248
 In consequence, the 1977 UN Code of 
Conduct on Transnational Corporations came out to comprehensively elaborate on 
foreign investors‟ obligations in host states. Yet, it has never been put into force due 
to the profound disagreements between developed and developing countries 
concerning the scope of minimum standards of treatment for foreign investors.
249
   
b. Excluding Domestic Investors from International Minimum Standards of 
Treatment   
Article 25 (1) of the Washington Convention excludes domestic 
investors/corporations from the substantive protection under the ICSID dispute 
resolution system.
250
 In contrast to the comprehensive jurisdiction of other 
international adjudicative bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights 
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(ECHR), the ICSID jurisdiction rationae personae apply only to the foreign investors 
of a contracting state.
251
 This means that the domestic investors are deprived from the 
unique features of ITA. Whereas foreign investors are entitled to international 
minimum standards of treatment, alternative dispute resolution system and direct 
enforcement of arbitration claims, domestic investors are denied corresponding rights 
over investment disputes. In that sense, domestic investors do not take advantage of 
the deterrent function of ITA in reviewing and assessing state‟s unlawful conduct vis-
à-vis private individuals and corporations (as illustrated in chapter one).
252
  
 
In spite of the fact that domestic investors are operating on the national level, they do 
not have equal access to the incentives and guarantees offered to foreign investors. 
Instead, they are bound to deal with non-specialized domestic arrangements in 
accordance with national policy stipulations which are often replaced by one-window 
apparatus for foreign investors. While the latter benefit from both international and 
domestic means of dispute settlement, domestic investors benefit only from domestic 
means of dispute settlement.
253
 Accordingly, domestic investors do not have the 
option of overshooting bureaucratic administrative and judicial proceedings. 
Moreover, the ICSID legal framework not only saves transnational investment from 
having resort to national courts system, but also from any "unilateral judicial action" 
taken by the host state. In contrast to domestic legal systems, judicial actions may 
constitute unlawful interference with an investment under international law. Finally, 
investors are likely to be awarded far higher amounts of damages by ICSID arbitral 
panels than the host state's national courts.
254
 
 
In the ordinary course of means, state sovereign immunity from jurisdiction prevents 
its national investors from bringing an action before international adjudicative fora.
255
 
Further, host states think twice before exceptionally allowing a domestic investor 
access to international Tribunals including ICSID's additional facility.
256
 Yet, 
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economic and political consideration may accord better negotiating power to some 
domestic investors through either contractual or treaty-based investment 
guarantees.
257
 For example, in concentrated economies, powerful investors may 
attempt to manoeuvre through exerting economic pressure on the host state in order to 
achieve an alternative dispute resolution.
258
 Contrariwise, in countries with 
underdeveloped institutions, unofficial dispute resolution methods may frequently 
include recourse to violence, political pressure or fraudulent practices against foreign 
investors.
259
  However, it has been suggested that ITA has a secondary function on the 
domestic level in promoting good governance particularly in developing states. It may 
drive the host state towards improving domestic alternative means for settlement of 
investment disputes whether in administrative or judicial form.
260
 In that view, 
domestic investors will avail themselves of better policy making, minimum standards 
of treatment, fair access to justice and consequently higher threshold of protection.  
 
It is true that the deterrent function of ITA may to some extent lead host states to 
develop preventive mechanisms for amicable settlement of investment disputes so as 
to avoid exposure to costly damages under the ICSID. In that case, both international 
and domestic investors will make use of it. The point does not lie with the existence 
of an effective alternative dispute system on the national level; rather it lies with the 
bargaining power of an investor to persuade the state to sit for an amicable settlement 
in the first place and to negotiate decent terms in the second place. This is not an easy 
task for a domestic investor compared to powerful MNCs that function on the 
international plane. In sum, the current legal framework of the ICSID tends to grant 
foreign investors far higher threshold of protection while excluding their domestic 
counterparts from any substantive form of protection. Whereas the former can simply 
rely on the Washington Convention, B/MITs, FTAs or at least an arbitration contract 
in order to initiate compulsory arbitration against the host state, the latter are largely 
shackled by sovereign immunity restrictions, administrative formalities and 
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unspecialized national arrangements. This is unless a domestic investor or corporation 
has in advance signed an arbitration agreement providing for investment 
arbitration.
261
  
C. FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: DYNAMICS OF 
INVESTMENT TREATY TRIBUNALS     
Aside from treaty term variations on the one hand, and the asymmetric basis of 
jurisdiction on the other, investment treaty tribunals themselves tend to interpret 
substantive standards of investment protection on a case-by-case basis. The lack of 
binding precedent to govern the practice of ITA has yielded divergent interpretations 
of central investment standards particularly on the application of indirect 
expropriation, Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) and Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
clauses.
262
 The absence of supervisory mechanisms to review and correct inconsistent 
awards adds more fuel to the already fragmented international investment regime. 
Jurisprudence on international investment law has failed to integrate a unified 
doctrine on the protection of foreign investment. As a result of this failure, increasing 
number of inconsistent arbitral awards worth billions of dollars in damages has been 
rendered against host states.
263
 Therefore, many scholars have vehemently criticized 
the current practice of investment treaty tribunals for elevating inflexible investment 
protection over the socio-economic regulatory power of host states.
264
 
The scope of international minimum standards of investment treatment has become 
unrestrained in relation to the host state's regulatory space.
265
 The inconclusive basis 
of states consent to the ICSID together with the imbalanced mainline jurisdiction has 
cursed the practice of ITA with legal uncertainty. At a maximum point of public 
disquiet, many countries have reconsidered their stances toward the ICSID system and 
investment treaty arbitration at large. Most of developed and developing countries 
have reacted to inflexible protection through either terminating or renegotiating their 
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BITs in order to meet domestic social and economic needs.
266
 State regulation in 
matters of public concern has been brought up in the new generation of B/MITs, 
especially in finance, labor, health, environment and human rights fields. 
Disinclination to accept controversial awards is also evident in the practice of some 
states through making use of annulment procedures before the ICSID.
267
 In this 
section, I briefly evaluate the process of institutional appointments under the ICSID 
system. Then, I examine the lack of binding precedent and supervisory mechanism in 
the practice of ITA as being sources of fragmentation in the international investment 
regime. Finally, I set out relevant case law on the concept of expropriation with an 
aim to appraise the different approaches used by investment treaty tribunals in order 
to distinguish between compensatory expropriation and state lawful regulation.  
1. Institutional Appointments of Arbitrators under the ICSID Framework  
Since the first case was registered in 1972, the ICSID has exercised control over the 
appointment process of arbitrators, conciliators and ad hoc committees. Some 
empirical studies suggest that arbitrator/counsel-related variables are among the most 
widely used models to predict investor-state disputes' outcomes.
268
 Up until 2015, less 
than 20% of ICSID's arbitral appointments embrace nationals of developing 
countries.
269
 Furthermore, the 2016 ICSID annual report notes that the same basis of 
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appointment distribution is still applied by the Centre‟s Administrative Council.270 In 
light of these findings, developed countries and their MNCs have a better legal 
representation than developing host states in investor-state disputes. This biased 
process of appointment has always been traced back to the high degree of 
sophistication that requires certain academic and professional credentials for arbitral 
appointments.
271
 Given the limited number of qualified arbitrators from developing 
states, the appointment process would ultimately favour developed countries interests. 
However, the lack of cultural diversity on the arbitral bench raises increasing 
concerns over ICSID's private law inclination that enables developed states' 
transnational businesses a smooth access to the Centre's facilities and consequently 
higher chances of victory.
272
 
According to the Washington Convention, the ICSID performs under the auspices of 
the World Bank (WB). Both the ICSID's chair and the Administrative Council are 
granted broad discretionary power in appointing arbitrators in investor-state disputes 
under article 38 of the Convention. Thus, developing states have little, if any, freedom 
regarding the selection of arbitrators in investment disputes.
273
 It is even disconcerting 
to identify that the ICSID is affiliated to the WB, since the president of the latter is the 
chair of the former. The conflicting interests manifest in the fact that the WB and the 
Centre share almost the same contracting states, staff members, administrative bodies 
as well as the headquarters. Most of the ICSID hearings are held in Washington, the 
same seat as the WB, and if not, in other developed countries like Britain, France or 
Germany.
274
 Furthermore, The WB as one of the global financial institutions that 
supports free-market values funds the ICSID Secretariat General.
275
 A network of 
appointed commercial arbitrators, private law firms and large financial institutions 
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backed by developed states insist on fidelity to inflexible protection.
276
 It is enough 
then to figure out that the ICSID neoliberal orientation favours private international 
investment as embodied in MNCs over states' regulatory power. 
 
The evidence also seems to suggest that a considerable number of assigned arbitrators 
put up with the WB's free market economic solutions. International arbitrators and 
lawyers who are engaged in investor-state disputes before the ICSID were already 
absorbed in a commercial environment.
277
 Thus, they perceive ITA as a branch of 
international commercial law rather than public international law.
278
 As I have argued 
in chapter one, the form and procedure of investment arbitration has historically 
evolved from the practice of commercial arbitration to investor-state arbitration. The 
paradox lies here in the fact that commercial arbitrators are now operating in a 
regulatory, rather than a commercial sphere. The legal contours of regulatory disputes 
in which states public authority is involved are utterly different from commercial 
relationships.
279
 In contrast to the public law principles of transparency, impartiality 
and neutrality, the practice of ITA under the ICSID draws heavily on political 
influence, professional patronage and sponsorship.
280
 Arbitrators advance 
expansionary interpretations that favor the financial stability of MNCs even at the 
expense of public policy concerns such as environment protection and human rights. 
These expansionary interpretations are deliberately sought to perfect the task of 
investment treaties in protecting private transnational investment.
281
 Given the 
neoliberal institutional context along with the commercial law background, a systemic 
community of arbitrators, academics, lawyers, economists and commentators 
interprets BITs far beyond the state parties' consent in promoting states' economic 
development side-by-side with investment protection.  
                                                          
276
 Id. 
277
 Id. 
278
 Id. at 27 
279
 See supra note 91   
280
 See supra note 275 at 60   
281
 Id. at 60-63   
56 
 
2. The Lack of Binding Precedent and Supervisory Mechanisms 
Although ITA is a relatively novel method for the settlement of investment disputes, it 
has developed a considerable amount of literature especially over the past two 
decades.
282
 The establishment of the ICSID has stimulated the penetration of private 
international investment into the host states' territories. Jurisprudence on ITA is 
fundamentally built on the pervasive investment provisions as included in thousands 
of B/MITs.
283
 Investment treaty terms have codified most of the customary 
international rules on the minimum standards of treatment and the international 
responsibility of states for injuries to aliens.
284
 But still, there is no multilateral legal 
framework to define investment, settle on the scope of investment standards of 
protection and account for the economic disparities between developed and 
developing countries.
285
 The ICSID legal framework under the Washington 
Convention does not set out the substantive rules governing the regulatory 
relationship between foreign investors and host states. Thus, investment treaty 
tribunals have been and remain the most dynamic zone of international investment 
law. Since they have a dual effect on both private investment interests and public-
policy-making, they presumably combine public and private international law rules 
into a single dispute resolution system.
286
 Yet, the overlapping standpoints of both 
private investment and host states have cursed the practice of investment treaty 
tribunals with more divergence.
287
 Investment treaty tribunals have never balanced 
between the host state‟s socio-economic rights and the protection of foreign investors 
against non-commercial risk.
288
  
Consistent with the general rule in public international adjudication,
289
 international 
investment law does not recognize a rule of stare decisis. Article 53 (1) of the ICSID 
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convention impliedly ignores the rule of legal precedent: "The award shall be binding 
on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except 
those provided for in this Convention." This means that investor-state disputes are to 
be settled on a case-by-case basis with respect to particular facts and parties in a 
specific context. Nevertheless, this is not to say that investment treaty tribunals 
disregard precedent in full; rather they do rely on each other's decisions in supporting 
their legal reasoning. International practice reveals that arbitral panels variably apply 
legal precedent depending on the subject-matter in question whether inter-state 
conflict, international trade, human rights or investment.
290
 The growing body of 
investment treaty law that stems from a network of more than 3000 B/MITs was seen 
as establishing a multilateral legal system on the minimum standards of investment 
protection.
291
 However, the jurisprudence of investment treaty tribunals shows a 
considerable amount of divergence rather than convergence. The lack of a binding 
rule of stare decisis in the practice of ITA has compelled arbitral tribunals to draw on 
variable textual interpretations for investment treaty standards.
292
 This includes most 
notably, direct and indirect expropriation, Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) and 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clauses. Paradoxically, investment treaty tribunals 
sought to largely expand the scope of investment protection far beyond the treaty 
parties' consent to its object and purpose. Even though most Investor-state treaty-
based arbitrations are undertaken under the ICSID legal framework, interpretations of 
investment standards included therein are frequently divergent and subject to change 
on a case-by-case basis. This discrepancy undermines the principles of legal stability 
and consistency that should exist in any sound legal system and consequently 
threatens the legitimacy of ITA.
293
   
From my perspective, fragmentation of international investment law may be attributed 
to two main reasons. First, Tribunals do not stick to the customary international law 
rules of interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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(VCLT).
294
 On the contrary, Investment treaty tribunals adopt a restrictive interpretive 
approach which considers only the ordinary textual meaning of an investment treaty 
while ignoring the treaty parties' consent. The second reason is that investment treaty 
tribunals have never settled the public-private conflict between the host state‟s 
regulatory power and the foreign investor‟s protection. I agree with Stephan Schill 
that investment treaty tribunals do create international investment law through 
precedent.
295
 However, the Washington Convention‟s travaux préparatoires supports 
the view that the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to the ICSID arbitrations.
296
 
One may suggest that some investment standards of treatment have relatively formed 
an overarching applicable law in investor-state disputes. Drawing on the similarity of 
BIT terms, Kaufmann-Kohler argues that investment treaty tribunals, in particular, 
must be bound in their legal reasoning by the rule of precedent.
297
 In contrast to both 
commercial and contract-based-investment tribunals, investment treaty tribunals form 
a part of the international legal order and hence they are under a "moral obligation" to 
follow precedent in their decisions.
298
 For example, MFN clauses in bilateral 
investment treaties have played a significant role in bringing uniformity into 
international investment standards of protection as previously illustrated in section 
one. Nevertheless, MFN clause has never been elevated to the status of precedent.
299
 
Sufficient evidence demonstrates that ICSID tribunals' law-making on international 
investment standards of protection does not construct a coherent body of precedent.
300
 
Instead, the frequent exceptions and derogation in the practice of investment treaty 
tribunals is anathema that lends investor-state dispute settlement to unpredictable 
outcomes.
301
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In the course of Argentina's economic crisis,
302
 some tribunals that involve the same 
facts and merits have adopted divergent approaches in making reference to earlier 
ICSID arbitral awards.
303
 In this respect, I compare three ICSID awards that adopt 
different approaches in deciding on the applicability of precedent to investor-state 
disputes. The tribunal in AES Corporation v. Argentina not only took a negative 
attitude towards precedent, but also acknowledged its contribution to the on-going 
process of fragmentation. In very odd language, the AES tribunal stated that “each 
tribunal remains [sovereign] and may retain, as it is confirmed by ICSID practice, [a 
different solution] for resolving the same problem."
304
 In the same year, using a 
different approach while responding to a one party's claim arguing for departure from 
earlier case law, the tribunal in Camuzzi v. Argentina adopted a positive approach 
towards precedent by concluding that “the tribunal has no reason not to concur with 
conclusion, even though some of the elements of facts in each dispute may differ in 
some respect.”305 A more balanced approach in deciding on the applicability of 
precedent to investor-state arbitration was endorsed by the tribunal in Daimler 
Financial Service AG v. Argentine. In spite of acknowledging that there is no such 
rule of stare decisis under international investment law, the tribunal concluded that 
"Each case must be decided on the basis of the applicable treaty texts and in light of 
the relevant facts… it is a fundamental principle of the rule of law that 'like cases 
should be decided alike' unless a strong reason exists to distinguish the current case 
from previous ones."
306
 It appears from this language that the Daimler Tribunal used 
an investigative approach vis-a-vis "all alike cases" in order to ensure a minimum 
degree of legal stability in its legal reasoning.
307
 This balanced approach is quite 
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different from AES's clear departure from the concept of the rule of law on the one 
hand and Camuzzi's disregard for the 'necessary evolution of the law on foreign 
investment.   
In light of these divergent interpretations of the scope of legal precedent in ITA, 
central investment standards have been inconsistently applied by one-off investment 
treaty tribunals. The absence of an appellate body to the institutional framework of the 
ICSID has exacerbated legal inconsistency whether at the jurisdictional or substantive 
level of ITA. As a result of this, more conflicting awards are expected to come out.
308
  
In many legal systems, the concept of legal precedent is in some way attached to the 
higher courts' judgments in final appeals. On the contrary, the lack of hierarchy 
among arbitral tribunals in international investment law makes it impossible to pursue 
such a concept of precedent.
309
 In my view, this fragmentation is essentially driven by 
the private law inclination of most investment treaty tribunals towards the interests of 
transnational foreign investment. The International Court of Justice as a form of 
international adjudication enjoys a relative jurisprudence constant, though has no 
formal rule of precedent.
310
 On the other side, annulment procedure under the ICSID 
has reflected more illegitimacy in the process of investor state dispute settlement. 
They have proven to be complex, costly and futile to many respondent states that 
opted to contest ICSID awards.
311
 An independent adjudicative body would be 
essential for reviewing and correcting possible inconsistent arbitral decisions. Indeed, 
this body would inspire the legal conduct of the key actors in investor-state disputes 
including arbitrators, international lawyers, economists and multinational 
corporations. Finally, challenged awards would help create an international normative 
order on the minimum standards of treatment for investment protection.
312
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3. Equating Indirect Expropriation with State Regulatory Measure: A 
Threefold Formulation 
The per se prohibition of non-compensatory expropriation of foreign investment is 
well-established under customary rules of international law. Under the Hull formula, 
states international responsibility to pay prompt, adequate and effective compensation 
for expropriating foreign assets is undisputed.
313
 The wide network of B/MITs
314
 
virtually prohibits expropriation except in cases where it is taken for public purpose, 
non-discriminatory, in accordance with due process of law and accompanied by 
proportionate compensation.
315
 Since expropriation was attached to the dispossession 
of private property owned by foreign investors in the aftermath of nationalisation, its 
definition did not apply to a situation where a foreign investor is still holding the 
alleged property. The proliferation of B/MITs after the advent of the ICSID has 
rendered this classical form of direct expropriation rarely applicable.
316
 States' modern 
practice of interference with the mere use of foreign investment without formal 
transfer of title has driven the jurisprudence on ITA to reverse "the possession 
paradigm" of expropriation to include other forms of indirect expropriatory conducts. 
Indirect expropriation has been frequently applied where no material deprivation 
resulting from the state public conduct, yet the use of an investment is negatively 
impacted.
317
 This tendency is justified under most legal systems by the investor's right 
to effective management and control as prerogatives to private ownership.
318
 Some 
capital-importing states, such as China and India, have turned to be a source of 
outward investment even to traditional exporting states. While developed states, 
particularly under NAFTA, have reacted by taking protectionist regulatory measures 
to protect people's health, environment and human rights, developing states managed 
to lower standards of national protection so as to attract bigger share from FDI.
319
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This shift in roles was reflected in the BITs boom in the 1990s through introducing a 
third category of measures which are "tantamount to expropriation". The lack of clear 
distinction between indirect expropriations and the new category of acts tantamount to 
an expropriation in the overwhelming majority of BITs have provided the basis for an 
expansionist approach to state regulatory acts in relation to foreign investors.
320
  
This threefold formulation of state regulatory measures to direct, indirect and acts 
tantamount to an expropriation has no comparable application in domestic law on 
regulatory takings. It was primarily intended by drafters with neoliberal backgrounds 
to construct a system of investment protection based on free market values and the 
sanctity of private property.
321
 The lack of any distinction under BITs between 
compensable indirect expropriation and non-compensable state regulation has mostly 
appeased the privately oriented commercial arbitrators and lawyers who aim to 
amplify the legal cause of arbitration with a view to bolster their profitable industry. 
Thinking of ITA as a form of commercial arbitration, most investment treaty tribunals 
have taken the law of expropriation beyond the treaty object and purpose as consented 
to by the treaty parties. A minimal governmental regulatory action becomes 
interference with the use of foreign investment that amounts to an expropriation.
322
 In 
interpreting and applying the vaguely drafted substantive standards of protection, 
investment treaty tribunals assume a powerful quasi-legislative function.
323
 In doing 
so, they intend to create a course of precedents on the international minimum standard 
of treatment, especially on indirect expropriation, FET and MFN clauses. Whereas 
some tribunals have ostensibly referred to the customary rules of interpretation under 
the VCLT as a means to legitimize their expansive interpretations, others have 
conversely used the latter's interpretive technics to derogate from previous 
decisions.
324
  
The existence of a third category of acts tantamount to takings without a precise 
definition gives rise to legal instability and inconsistency in the practice of ITA. 
Investment treaty tribunals have largely extended the applicability of indirect 
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expropriation terms to almost all state regulatory measures. Thus, they maintain a 
domestic normative scheme favourable to foreign investment that obviously exceeds 
international minimum standards of treatment.
325
 The threefold formulation magnifies 
the substantive principles of state responsibility to cover lawful regulatory actions 
while leaving the state defenceless against foreign investors' transgressions. 
Furthermore, opponent arbitrators' proposals to develop a counterclaim mechanism in 
the practice of ITA as a means of distinction between indirect expropriation and 
lawful regulation were ignored by ICSID arbitral panels.
326
 Instead of examining host 
state's intention behind taking regulatory measures, arbitral tribunals have endorsed an 
"all or nothing" paradigm that either grants investor full compensation or denies the 
latter any kind of indemnification. ICSID case law indicates that even if a regulatory 
measure is taken in the course of the state traditional role in advancing public welfare 
with no intention to cause injury to an investor and do not contravene investment 
legitimate expectations, it may invoke state responsibility for affecting the economic 
value of an investment.
327
 In fact, the ambiguity of the requirements that establish 
indirect expropriation in the first place makes it more problematic to differentiate the 
latter from the newly introduced acts tantamount to takings in the second place. Under 
this authority, two main doctrines have emerged in the jurisprudence of ITA to 
distinguish compensatory expropriation from state lawful regulation.
328
 
The "sole effect doctrine" is considered the founding form of the "all or nothing" 
paradigm. The impact of a governmental measure on an investor is the sole factor 
required for the occurrence of a compensable expropriation. This is regardless of 
whether the regulatory measure is taken for attaining a public purpose such as health 
or environment protection.
329
 In Metalclad v. Mexico, a US corporation alleged loss of 
"an expected economic benefit" as a result of a Mexican municipality rejection of a 
construction permit for a hazardous waste transfer landfill was deemed as sufficient 
for establishing compensatory expropriation.
330
 The tribunal concluded that "covert or 
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incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the 
owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected 
economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host 
State."
331
 The Metalclad case is an outcome of the "tantamount clause" in newer 
BITs. In my view, the Tribunal flagrantly undermines the principle of sovereign 
independence of states which is at the heart of general international law. Such a 
precarious approach does not only rely on inexistent factual evidence represented in 
the alleged lost-opportunity, but also impedes state power to regulate matters of 
public policy concern such as protecting its population from hazardous waste in the 
present case. Although there was no imminent value depreciation which is an 
essential requirement for compensatory expropriation, the tribunal relied on the 
"tantamount" development to maintain a normative condition favourable to the 
foreign investor in recovering compensation. 
On the other hand, some Tribunals have used the "police power doctrine" to 
distinguish between compensable expropriation and non-compensable regulatory 
measure. The excessive reliance by foreign investors on the broad definition of 
indirect expropriation to thwart state regulations has driven some recent tribunals to 
develop a public purpose criterion. For such an end, they draw on a restrictive 
approach which mainly focuses on the the nature rather than the impact of state 
measure.
332
 For instance, in the NAFTA case, Methanex v. United States, the tribunal 
held that the US. Executive order banning the use of 'MTBE' substance, which is used 
as a fuel additive, for its serious threat to human health and environment is a lawful 
regulatory measure; and accordingly the tribunal provided for no compensation.
333
 In 
contrast to Metalclad, the Tribunal in Methanex refuted the investor's claim based on 
the deprivation of a reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit. The latter 
maintained that since the challenged governmental order is taken for general welfare 
and without discrimination, the state is not liable for compensation. Later in Saluka v. 
Czech Republic, the Tribunal stated that "it is now established in international law that 
States are not liable to pay compensation to a foreign investor when, in the normal 
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exercise of their regulatory powers, they adopt in a non-discriminatory manner bona 
fide regulations that are aimed at the general welfare."
334
 Under the police power 
doctrine, if the state measure is non-discriminatory, taken for a legitimate public 
purpose and in accordance with due process of law, no compensation will be awarded, 
unless a specific commitment was initially made vis-à-vis an investor.
335
 However, 
the Saluka award recognizes the difficulty of such approach in application by 
concluding that "international law has yet to identify in a comprehensive and 
definitive fashion precisely what regulations are considered permissible and 
commonly accepted as falling within the police or regulatory power of States and, 
thus, non-compensable."
336
  
The adoption of "public interest" as a decisive criterion in both Methanex and Saluka 
awards to distinguish lawful regulation from expropriation may be seen as a step 
forward in curbing the inflexible protection of investment. However, the volatile 
definition of public interest under international law makes it practically impossible to 
distill comprehensive requirements for non-compensable regulations under the police 
power doctrine. Further, the restrictive approach in interpreting indirect expropriation 
through disregarding the effect of the state measure on an investor is detrimental to 
international investment law at large.
337
 Finally, it is worth mentioning that both 
decisions, Methanex and Saluka, were decided in accordance with the UNCTRAL 
model law. Some commentators have justified this restrictive approach to indirect 
expropriation regulatory power by the fact that both cases have involved regulatory 
powers taken by developed states to deal with increasing challenges to national 
security, health or environment.
338
 I believe that similar awards in the same vein 
under ICSID's arbitration rules are rare, if they exist at all.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I examined the governing legal framework of investment treaty 
tribunals under the ICSID. The Washington Convention does not constitute a self-
contained substantive regime for ITA. In section one, I sought to answer whether 
variations in investment treaty terms have driven international investment law to 
fragmentation. It is suggested that quid pro quo bargains and relative negotiating 
powers of treaty parties underlying the concept of BITs have rendered the latter 
essentially variable in content and structure. Nevertheless, I argued that changes in 
BITs terms are mainly concerned with generalities rather than details of substantive 
standards of treatment. Most of BITs contain standardized provisions for investment 
protection particularly on the prohibition of non-compensable expropriation, FET and 
MFN. I found that even in cases of almost identical treaty terms, arbitral tribunals 
arrive at consistent interpretation of international minimum standards. It is true that 
the treaty parties create their own investment treaty, yet arbitral tribunals turn out to 
be the supreme interpreters of when and how treaty law applies. Treaty parties are 
assumed to impliedly delegate comprehensive interpretive power to one-off arbitral 
tribunals. However, the scope of interpretation the tribunal may exert increases or 
decreases depending on either the clarity or the ambiguity of treaty language. The 
more ambiguous is the treaty language, the wider is the scope of interpretation to an 
investment tribunal. I concluded that despite variations in treaty terms, the effect of 
the latter remains subordinate to tribunals‟ interpretations in predicting outcomes.  
In section two, I critically scrutinized the ICSID's asymmetrical basis of jurisdiction 
in defining both the "protected investment" and the "protected investor". It is quite 
odd that neither the Convention Preamble, nor the conventional terms provide a 
definition for what is to be qualified as a protected investment for the purpose of the 
ICSID litigation. Despite the fact that the Preamble clearly requires a certain 
contribution by a private international investment to the contracting states economic 
development in order to be qualified as an investment, some tribunals have 
intentionally ignored such a requirement. The parameters set forth in most B/MITs on 
what constitutes an investment are frequently similar in term and content, yet they 
often provide vague conditions for defining an investment. In light of this lacuna, 
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ICSID arbitral panels take a broad approach in interpreting protected investment with 
an aim to amplify protection for transnational investment. Even though earlier 
decisions defer to the preamblar condition regarding the contribution of an investment 
to the host state's economic development, recent jurisprudence shows divergent 
approaches in defining an investment. Some tribunals like Victor Pey and Quiborax 
endorse a restrictive approach that depends on mere textual meaning while ignoring 
the object and purpose of the ICSID Convention. Moreover, the high degree of legal 
sophistication, technical complexity and costly proceedings in the ICSID litigation 
limits the jurisdiction rationae personae of the ICSID to multinational corporations 
and developed countries‟ investors. I noted that a little amount of the literature on ITA 
discusses the discriminatory nature of the ICSID litigation in excluding the domestic 
investors from the international minimum standards of protection. I argued that such 
jurisdictional deficit rigorously contravenes the well-established procedural rules of 
fairness and equality.  
In section three, I drew on the different approaches used by investment treaty 
tribunals to interpret the definition of indirect expropriation. Jurisprudence on ITA has 
reversed "the possession paradigm" in expropriation to include other forms of indirect 
takings. Yet, it provides no definite distinction between the latter and the state lawful 
regulation. Thus, Investment treaty tribunals rely on variable textual interpretations 
for defining expropriation as the central standard in international investment law. The 
lack of a binding rule of precedent along with an appellate body in the practice of ITA 
has exacerbated inconsistency whether at the jurisdictional or substantive level. 
Furthermore, introducing a third category of measures "tantamount to expropriation" 
in the newer version of BITs provides a basis for an expansionist interpretation to 
state regulatory acts in relation to foreign investors. Thinking of ITA as a form of 
commercial arbitration, most investment treaty tribunals have taken the law of 
expropriation beyond the treaty parties consent. Instead of objectively examining the 
governmental regulatory action in the course of awarding damages, arbitral tribunals 
endorse an "all or nothing" paradigm that considers the interests of either party. 
Neither the "sole effect criterion" nor the "police power doctrine" provides for a 
comprehensive approach to the distinction between compensatory expropriation and 
non-compensable state regulation.  
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IV. INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AS PUBLIC LAW 
ADJUDICATION: MAPPING OUT A REGULATORY SPACE FOR 
THE HOST STATE 
Even though investment treaty arbitration combines the form and procedures of 
international commercial arbitration, it performs under the substantive principles of 
public international law. As I argued in chapter one, the function of ITA in reviewing 
and adjudicating states exercise of public authority vis-à-vis foreign investors makes 
it akin to public law's judicial review of governmental actions. Yet, the private law 
inclination of investment treaty tribunals towards inflexible protection of transnational 
investment hinders the host state‟s right to pursue legitimate public policy objectives. 
The expansive interpretations of international investment standards which were set 
out in chapter two extend investment protection beyond the treaty parties' intention 
under the ICSID conceptual framework. A significant part of the literature on ITA 
puts forward a number of remedial measures to address the current fragmentation of 
international investment regime. Most of these remedies focus on the institutional 
reform of the ICSID legal framework. They vary from establishing an "independent 
international investment court"
339
 to developing an "ICSID appellate body".
340
 
Undoubtedly, that would help revise inconsistent awards that may be rendered under 
one-off investment treaty tribunals.
341
 Other institutional proposals suggest a fairer 
institutional process for appointing arbitrators in order to increase objectivity, 
accountability and transparency in the practice of ITA.
342
 On the procedural level, 
some studies recommend the "consolidation of claims", whenever applicable, to avoid 
potentially conflicting conclusions by different tribunals on the same subject 
matter.
343
 This technique would ensure procedural uniformity in the practice of ITA, 
raise predictability of the host state and foreign investor and prevent over-litigation 
and double recovery.
344
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However, I contend that both institutional and procedural reforms are basically 
contingent on either renegotiating the ICSID convention, or realizing a Multilateral 
Agreement on investment protection (MAI) to replace the diverse network of BITs 
existing today. Despite being comprehensive, these reform proposals seem unfeasible 
due to the everlasting conflicting interests of developed and developing states, 
multinational corporations, commercial arbitrators, and host states' civil society.
345
 
Instead, this chapter presents a pragmatic approach based on the self-reformation of 
investment treaty tribunals law-making. The hybridity of ITA is the entry point for 
remoulding the law-making process on public law concepts of adjudication. I argue 
that reintroducing ITA as a public law model of adjudication may drive the system to 
self-reformation. To that effect, I set out a workable three-pronged framework for 
investment treaty tribunals law-making; namely, interpretive, conceptual and 
comparative. In section one, I lay out an interpretive approach for investment treaty 
tribunals. I draw on the customary rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT) as a basis for interpretation of substantive standards of protection.
346
 
In section two, by applying the VCLT interpretive guidelines on the conceptual 
framework of the Washington Convention, I emphasize the correlation between 
investment protection and the host state's right to economic development as an object 
to the ICSID. Further, I rely on article 42 (1) of the Washington Convention, 
whenever a given BIT term allows, as a basis for integrating rules on corporate social 
responsibility. In section three, I suggest a comparative framework for investment 
treaty tribunals law-making. First, I point out to the significance of the general 
principles of law and judicial decisions as formal sources of public international law 
in reforming ITA from within. Second, I examine the use of proportionality in 
comparative public law review of governmental actions. Considering its relevance to 
ITA, I argue for accommodating the principle of proportionality as a general principle 
of law in investment treaty tribunals law-making. For such an end, I lay out a three-
step test to delineate the boundary between compensatory expropriation and non-
compensable lawful regulation. 
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A. THE INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK: CUSTOMARY RULES OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES  
Investment treaties cannot be interpreted in isolation from general international law. It 
is well established under the principle pacta sunt servanda that treaty parties are 
bound to carry out their international obligations in good faith. Still, international 
investment law has not generated a self-contained system of substantive rights and 
obligations. The open-ended investment standards and guarantees stated in a wide 
body of B/MITs have yielded divergent interpretations by one-off arbitral tribunals. 
Only a few investment treaties, like NAFTA,
347
Canada, and the US model BITs, 
explicitly refer to the customary rules of international law on treaty interpretation.
348
 
Additionally, the latter elaborates on the definition of customary international law.
349
  
Even if there is no such explicit stipulation, investment treaty tribunals, operating 
within the ambit of public international law, have a formal room for reference to 
customary rules of international law applicable to investment disputes. Through 
consenting to investment arbitration, treaty parties impliedly delegate their law-
making powers, including most notably interpretive authority, to potential arbitral 
tribunal. Since investment treaties create general rather than specific standards for the 
protection of foreign investment, such standards must be interpreted before they can 
                                                          
347 Under the NAFTA, article 1105 (1) on the minimum standard of treatment provides that "Each 
Party shall accord to investments of investors of another party treatment in accordance with 
international law." similarly, article 1131 (1) on the governing law stipulates that the "Tribunal 
established under this Section shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this agreement [and] 
applicable rules of international law." The clear language of article 1131 (1) of the NAFTA refers to 
the compulsory application of the rules of international law on investment disputes; (In fact, this is 
quite different from the apparent supplementary application of customary international law under 
article 42 (1) of the ICSID which states that:"The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with 
such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. [In the absence of such agreement], the Tribunal 
shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of 
laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable.") 
348
Article 5 (1) of the US – 2012 – model BIT on the minimum standard of treatment states that "Each 
Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary international law, 
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security."  
349
Annex (A) of the US – 2012 – model BIT treaty provides a definition to the "Customary 
International Law" mentioned in articles 5 (1) and 6 concerning expropriation and compensation; it 
states that "The Parties confirm their shared understanding that “customary international law” generally 
and as specifically referenced in… results from a general and consistent practice of States that they 
follow from a sense of legal obligation."  
71 
 
be applied. This justifies the fact that investment tribunals have historically taken the 
lead in developing international investment law through law-making.
350
  
1. A Restrictive Approach to the VCLT Interpretive Guidelines 
Since the very first treaty-based investment arbitration, AAPL v. Republic of Shri 
Lanka, the interpretive guidelines of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT) have been presumably considered in the tribunals' law-making process.
351
 
Yet, most investment treaty tribunals take a restrictive approach in applying the 
latter's "general rule of interpretation" under article 31. In doing so, tribunals limit 
their interpretations to the ordinary meaning of investment treaty text under article 31 
(1) while ignoring its object and purpose. It is quite odd that a large number of 
investor-state tribunals have not even mentioned the interpretive guidelines of the 
VCLT in defining the substantive principles of investment protection.
352
 As truly 
observed by Sornarajah, the paradox lies in the fact that arbitral tribunals only satisfy 
the ordinary meaning of treaty terms and turn a blind eye to the object and purpose of 
the treaty as envisaged by article 31 and 32 of the VCLT.
353
 Such restrictive approach 
not only abstracts investment standards from their intended purpose as originally 
anticipated by the treaty parties, but also extends their application to undesired areas 
of mere regulatory discretion of states. In that regard, the challenged award of Sempra 
Energy International v. Argentina concludes that "interpretation is not the exclusive 
task of States; it is also the duty of tribunals called upon to settle a dispute, 
particularly when the question is to interpret the meaning of the terms used in a 
treaty."
354
 Despite the clear reference to the VCLT interpretive rules, the award has 
been challenged on grounds of manifest errors of law, excess of power and failure to 
state reasons.
355
 Censuring Sempra's selective adherence to the general rule of 
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interpretation, the annulment committee concludes that "relevant rules of international 
law should be used to interpret BIT provisions that either reflect customary 
international law or are not defined in the BIT. The Tribunal interpreted Article XI in 
accordance with relevant rules of treaty interpretation, as codified in Articles 31 and 
32 of the VCLT."
356
  
On a different account, the tribunal in Tokios Tokéles v. Ukraine made a controversial 
decision on jurisdiction as a result of using a restrictive approach to interpretation.
357
 
Despite the fact that the claimant Lithuanian corporation was controlled by Ukrainian 
nationals who own (99) percent of the company‟s shares, incorporated under 
Ukrainian law, maintained its administrative headquarters in the latter; the Tribunal 
considered the company as falling within the category of protected investors under the 
ICSID framework.
358
 This expansive approach misinterprets the rationae personae 
jurisdictional basis of the ICSID in providing substantive protection only for foreign 
investors as explicitly stated in both the Preamble and article 25 (1) of the 
Convention. Further, it confuses the legal theories on nationality of international 
corporations whether under civil law or common law systems. Whereas the former 
endorses the nationality or domicile of individuals dominating the majority of shares 
as a decisive criterion, the latter recognizes the administrative seat as a basis for the 
enterprise nationality.
359
 Thus, the Tokios Tokéles tribunal did not comprehensively 
apply the VCLT interpretive guidelines. First, the tribunal has restricted the definition 
of investors to the ordinary textual meaning of the Lithuania-Ukraine BIT, while 
ignoring the main object of the Washington convention as only protecting foreign 
rather than domestic investors. Second, the non-exhaustive interpretation of the VCLT 
guidelines in examining the definition of protected investors under the Lithuania-
Ukraine BIT has expanded the scope of protection beyond the treaty party intention –
Ukraine in the given case. 
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2. A Comprehensive Methodology for Investment Treaty Tribunals' Law-
Making    
Against this backdrop, I believe that the faithful application of customary 
international rules on treaty interpretation provided for in articles 31 and 32 of the 
VCLT would tackle the inconsistent practice of ITA from within. In fact, both articles 
offer an interpretive methodology which covers both bilateral and multilateral 
investment treaties. I argue for an interpretive methodology for investment treaty 
tribunals' law-making process that fulfills two essential features: it must be inclusive 
and exhaustive. First, I mean by the inclusive application that the VCLT interpretative 
rules must be inclusively applied to the substance of both the Washington Convention 
and the BIT in question. The Washington Convention is perceived as constituting the 
overarching legal framework of ITA that gives rise to the conclusion of thousands of 
B/MITs. This follows that the latter should not by any mean contravene the former‟s 
general provisions as in the case of Tokios Tokéles with respect to the definition of an 
investor under the ICSID framework. Thus, the inclusive application of article 31 and 
32 of the VCLT interpretive rules appears to be indispensable in discerning the full 
understanding of the minimum standards of protection in the case at hand. Moreover, 
I argue that such application of articles 31 and 32 has a specific importance in striking 
a balanced conceptual framework as to the rights and obligations of both parties under 
the ICSID litigation, as I will elaborate on in the next sub-section.
360
 In spite of the 
fact that article 31 may suffice in some cases to extract the essence of the treaty 
conventional terms, it does not do the same to the preamblar terms of the ICSID 
Convention or other BITs. Therefore, article 32 comes into play whenever article 31 
leads to indefinite, vague or unreasonable conclusions
361
 like what has been 
experienced by many arbitral tribunals while interpreting the definition of investment 
under article 25 (1) of the Washington Convention.
362
 There is no doubt that the 
historical context, socio-political conditions and negotiation circumstances that 
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coincided with the treaty conclusion are of mounting concern in distilling the parties' 
real intentions.
363
  
Second, investment treaty tribunals must exhaustively apply the interpretive 
techniques set forth in the general rule of interpretation under article 31 of the VCLT. 
This exhaustive approach is in fact required by the clear language of article 31 (1) 
which provides that “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty [in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose].” The word "and" demonstrates that the examination of 
the interpretive means should not be confined to the treaty's ordinary meaning of the 
texts; rather it should go further to examine the parties' mutual intent at the time they 
have signed an investment treaty. This dictates a cumulative application of the 
"ordinary meaning" as well as the "object and purpose criteria" as stated in article 31 
(1) as a first step. In that meaning, I emphasize that the tribunal must ascertain that the 
ordinary meaning criterion matches rather than supplements the object and purpose of 
the treaty. In a second step, the tribunal proceeds to examine all other prescribed 
interpretive techniques provided for under the general rule of interpretation in article 
31 to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the treaty terms in light of its object 
and purpose. In this meaning, article 31 (2) of the VCLT elaborates on the context 
stipulated in article 31 (1): "The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a 
treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes…" 
This language requires that the process of interpretation must not stop at article 31 (1) 
of the VCLT, rather it must proceed with the examination of other interpretive 
guidelines provided for under article 31 (2), (3) and (4) in the first place and article 32 
in the second place.
364
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B. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: COUNTERBALANCING INVESTOR’S 
RIGHTS WITH OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE WASHINGTON CONVENTION 
The expansive interpretations of investment treaty tribunals have elevated the foreign 
investor‟s private rights over the host state‟s public interests. Public international law 
principles of sovereign independence and non-intervention are blatantly eroded under 
the current practice of ITA.
365
 The Preamble of the Washington Convention confirms 
the role of private international investment in promoting economic cooperation and 
development among contracting states. Particularly, developing countries had 
perceived the advent of the ICSID as a global tool for attracting FDI to their nascent 
economies.
366
 They have signed B/MITs with the intention of giving the capital-
exporting states positive signals that they owe their investors preferential treatment 
over their territories. In that sense, the ICSID is primarily seen as a balancing 
equilibrium between sovereign states and foreign investors.
367
 However, as critically 
shown in chapter two, some empirical findings question the relationship between ITA 
under the ICSID and the promotion of economic development in the host states. In 
particular, low and middle-income developing countries are double-burdened by 
costly proceedings and highly punitive awards under ICSID litigation. Thus, the 
decisive function of ITA in boosting the economic development of the host states 
becomes more dubious by the unrestrained interpretations of investment treaty 
standards.
368
  
The unpredictable application of the minimum standards of protection has largely 
barred host states from pursuing national econometric policies essential for 
development.
369
 Moreover, it has even disallowed the latter from holding 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) accountable for their wrongdoing against the 
residing population in matters of common concern such as healthcare, environmental 
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protection, human rights, labour entitlements, fighting corruption, taxation and 
financial regulation. Although there has been a shift in state practice towards 
curtailing the penetration of ITA into the public regulatory sphere, tribunals seem 
hesitant to respond to non-investment concerns. Building on the proposed 
comprehensive methodology for interpretation, I intend to reconceptualise the 
objectives of ITA under the ICSID legal framework. In doing so, I aim to restore the 
legal equilibrium between the protection of foreign investment and the host state‟s 
right to pursue economic development. Second, I draw on an integrationist 
interpretation of both article 31 (3) (C) of the VCLT and article 42 (1) of the 
Washington Convention, when applicable, to develop rules on corporate social 
responsibility vis-à-vis host states. These rules, I argue, would essentially 
equiponderate the host state's international responsibility for injuries to foreign 
investors. 
1. Identifying the Host State's Right to Economic Development as an Object 
to ICSID Litigation 
In the midst of the ICSID negotiations, contracting states have disputed the definition 
of protected investment and consequently have left the matter to the parties consent in 
each BIT and then to the tribunal's discretionary power.
370
 While developing states 
have managed to stress the essence of public interest in investor-state disputes, 
developed states aimed to maximize the sanctity of private property. For example the 
United Kingdom, as a capital-exporting country, has proposed a definition of 
investment based on economic activity rather than economic development.
371
 This 
conflict has ultimately led the contracting states not to assign a definition of 
investment to the Washington Convention at all.
372
 Article 25 (1) establishing the 
mainline jurisdiction of the ICSID stipulates that “the jurisdiction of the Center shall 
apply to [any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment] between a 
Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State 
designated by that State to the Center) and a national of another Contracting State.” 
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Obviously, the language in "any legal dispute" maintains a broad scope of what may 
qualify as an investment for the purpose of the ICSID convention.
373
 Therefore, the 
Washington convention has principally transferred the burden of defining the 
protected investment to the law-making power of investment treaty tribunals 
depending on the BIT terms at issue.
374
  
 
In contrast to ICSID's conventional terms, the Preamble has clearly emphasized the 
correlation between protection of private international investment and promotion of 
economic development in the contracting states. In this meaning, the very first 
paragraph of the Preamble provides that “Considering the need for international 
cooperation for economic development, and the role of private international 
investment therein; bearing in mind the possibility that from time to time disputes 
may arise in connection with such investment between Contracting States and 
nationals of other Contracting States."
375
 Even though the Preamble does not provide 
comprehensive definition of investment, it sets out a general condition for qualifying 
the protected investment, that is, the contribution of the protected investment to the 
host state's economic development. Nevertheless, historical political and economic 
circumstances denote that the promotion of economic development of the host states 
side-by-side with the protection of transnational investment has been the main object 
of ITA under the ICSID framework.
376
 In that sense, ITA is perceived as a decisive 
tool for economic development more than an alternative method for dispute 
settlement.
377
 States agreed to grant foreign investors and multinational corporations a 
preferential treatment with the intention of attracting foreign capital flows as essential 
for the process of economic development.
378
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Despite the fact that each BIT encompasses a self-standing definition of investment, 
most BITs use the same exact provisions for qualifying protected investment.
379
 
While some investment treaties, like the US model BITs of 1994, 2004 and 2012, 
have maintained the same preamblar condition on the contribution to the host state's 
economic development, others have remained silent towards the latter.
380
 Following 
the same line of argument in chapter two, I believe that the investment treaty 
tribunals' inconsistent interpretations of the definition of investment rather than treaty 
term variations brought about the fragmentation of international investment law. 
Some recent decisions like Victor Pey Casado & President Allende Foundation v. The 
Republic of Chile and Quiborax v. Bolivia have ignored the criterion of the 
“contribution to the host state's economic development” in qualifying an investment 
for the purpose of the ICSID jurisdiction rationae materaie.
381
 These tribunals have 
restricted the interpretation of investment definition to the ordinary meaning of treaty 
terms through selective application of article 31 of the VCLT. I contend that such 
restrictive reading of treaty terms neither reflects the BIT parties' intention, nor 
observes the central object of the ICSID in promoting states economic development. 
In this respect, I argue that the inclusive and exhaustive application of the interpretive 
guidelines laid down by the VCLT would help in defining the protected investment. 
 
On the one hand, the inclusive application of the VCLT interpretive guidelines entails 
that the tribunal's interpretation of investment under a given BIT be consistent with 
the overarching framework of the ICSID convention. Thus, the definition of the 
protected investment must primarily satisfy the general condition set out by the ICSID 
Preamble, i.e. foreign investment contribution to the host state's economic 
development. This comprehensive methodology for qualifying an investment is quite 
supported by article 31 (2) (a) and (b) of the VCLT general rule which provides that:  
[T]he context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty 
shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble 
and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was 
made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion 
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of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or 
more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and 
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the 
treaty.
382
  
 
Undoubtedly, this essentially involves the Washington Convention, being recognized 
in advance by both parties to a given BIT. Furthermore, article 31 (2) also comprises 
the United Nations Charter as a multilateral legal instrument of public international 
law.
383
 In spite of its generic nature, the UN Charter embraces a considerable amount 
of international law principles, particularly the principle of sovereign equality of 
states.
384
 Since it is mutually accepted by state parties, the latter must be considered 
by investment treaty tribunal while interpreting the definition of an investment 
pursuant to a given BIT term. In that sense, sovereign equality entails that the host 
state must authorize a certain activity over its territory in order to be qualified as a 
protected investment for the purpose of the ICSID Convention.
385
 
 
On the other hand, the exhaustive application of the VCLT guidelines requires that the 
tribunal satisfy all interpretive techniques under the general rule of article 31(1), (2), 
(3) and (4).
386
 This means that the tribunal must understand that the ordinary meaning 
of a treaty text complements rather than contradicts the object and purpose of the 
ICSID. For such an end, it shall equally consider preamblar texts side by side with 
conventional texts in deciding what qualifies as an investment. In addition to that, the 
exhaustive approach of interpretation allows the tribunal, in the event the general rule 
of interpretation under article 31 does not produce consistent conclusion recourse to 
the supplementary means of interpretation under article 32 (a) and (b). The latter 
stipulates that “Recourse may be made to supplementary means of interpretation, 
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, 
in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to 
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) Leaves the 
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meaning ambiguous or obscure; (b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable.”387 This may be useful where a BIT does not provide for the general 
criterion on the contribution to the host state's economic development such as in the 
(2005) German model BIT.
388
 Such recourse, I believe, is imperative to maintain an 
interpretive balance between the given BIT terms and the ICSID convention.  
In defining the protected investment under the Jordan–Italy BIT, the remarkable 
award of Salini et al. v. Morocco (2001) considers the Preamble's limitation on the 
ICSID jurisdiction rationae materaie.
389
 While interpreting the definition of 
investment under the given BIT, the tribunal concluded that “[the common intention] 
of the Parties is reflected in this clear text.” These words obviously contest the textual 
argument in defining protected investment as relying on mere "economic activity or 
asset" and goes further to examine ICSID's purpose in promoting the contracting 
states economic development. Presided over by Judge Guillaume, the tribunal laid 
down an interpretive methodology based on the inclusive and exhaustive application 
of the VCLT interpretive guidelines. In doing so, Salini duly observes the parties‟ 
intention beyond the ordinary meaning of article 31 and 32 as evidenced whether in 
the ICSID Preamble or its travaux prepartoires. Finally, the tribunal develops a "four-
part test" which requires an investment to have four essential elements in order to be 
qualified as protected under the ICSID jurisdiction; namely: “a contribution of money 
or assets; a fixed duration; an element of risk; and a contribution to the host state‟s 
economic development.”390   
The jurisprudential adherence to the Salini four-part test would not only promote 
economic development of the contracting states as an object of the ICSID, but also 
provide the host states with more predictability in the practice of ITA. Yet, a 
counterargument against the suggested comprehensive methodology for interpretation 
is that the VCLT general rule of interpretation applies only to state-to-state disputes 
and consequently does not cover international disputes involving individuals. In this 
regard, Weeramantry confirms that the VCLT customary rules are applicable to all 
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international disputes regardless of their subject matter or involved parties. He 
contends that this methodology is best exemplified by the European Court of Human 
Rights' interpretive approach which consistently refers to the VCLT customary rules 
of interpretation, despite featuring individual-state disputes.
391
 From a public law 
perspective, customary rules of international law justify the application of the Salini 
test in the practice of ITA as public law adjudication. In my view, Salini award offers 
a balanced approach to the interpretation of the definition of investment as it accounts 
equally for private corporate interests and public policy concerns. Further, the Salini 
four-part test lays down a strong jurisdictional precedent that respects the principle of 
sovereign independence of states in approving investment entry into their 
territories.
392
 
2. Integrating Rules on Corporate Social Responsibility in Investor-State 
Disputes  
The core concept of investment treaty arbitration is to provide foreign MNCs an 
alternative dispute resolution system away from the national court system. At the 
same time, the legal status of MNCs renders them practically unbound whether by the 
international investment law principles or the host state's internal laws and 
regulations. In exploring the reform of international investment law in the area of 
corporate conduct, the hybrid nature of ITA comes again into play. The difficulty here 
lies in the fact that multinational corporations (MNCs), unlike state parties, are not 
counted among subjects of international law. Instead, they are private law entities 
operating on the international sphere.
393
 This legal status is what I believe makes ITA 
a one-sided litigation since investment treaty tribunals have not so far developed a 
methodology that fits into the unique public-private nature of ITA.
394
 In this regard, 
Stephan Schill insightfully points out that "When the two streams of investment 
protection and corporate responsibility meet and mix, it will be difficult to maintain a 
system of inflexible investment protection.
395
 The emergence of new defences with 
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respect to corporate responsibility in the newer generation of BITs strongly pushes 
towards a balanced law-making process. In the same vein, I propose the adoption of 
an integrationist approach that embraces the customary rules of interpretation as 
enshrined in articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT insofar as the conceptual framework of 
the given BIT permits. I propose a two-fold approach to ITA self-reformation that 
suits the hybridity of the ICSID dispute resolution system.  
First, I argue for integrating domestic legal instruments and mechanisms on corporate 
compliance. The conceptual framework of article 42 (1) of the Washington 
Convention, whenever applicable, constitutes a basis for an integrationist approach to 
reform. According to article 42 (1) of the Convention: “The tribunal shall decide 
disputes in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. [In the 
absence of such agreement], the tribunal shall apply the law of the contracting state 
party to the dispute (including rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of 
international law that may be applicable.” Although article 42 (1) concludes that the 
substantive law to ICSID disputes is to be determined in accordance with the parties 
agreement, it advances the applicability of the host state internal law in the absence of 
an agreement. The remarkable award of World Duty Free v. Kenya presents 
jurisprudential evidence towards the integration of corporate responsibility in arbitral 
tribunals law-making.
396
 The award relied on English law, particularly the common 
law rule of "unclean hands", to invalidate an investment agreement for proven 
allegations of corruption at the inception of foreign investment. Even though the 
World Duty Free arbitration was contract-based investment dispute, it opens a door to 
the host state counterclaims in cases of proven corruption.
397
 This unequivocally 
suggests the possibility of embracing corporate social responsibility (CSR) into the 
domestic law of the host state. In the case of contractual investment arbitration, 
foreign investors are frequently subject to the host state's internal law pursuant to a 
contractual relationship.
398
 However, I contend that article 42 (1) allows investment 
treaty tribunals interpretive leeway for integrating domestic rules on CSR into the 
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law-making process. Thus, even though the host state and the foreign investor agree 
on the substantive applicable law to the dispute, this does not, by any means, render 
the domestic law of the host state irrelevant to the merits of the dispute.
399
  
I believe that the ICSID legal framework diminishes the jurisdiction of the host state 
law insofar as the latter contradicts or minimizes the international standards of 
protection for foreign investment. In fact, this is consistent with the customary rules 
of international law. In this respect, article 27 of the VCLT entitled, "Internal Law and 
Observance of Treaties", provides that “A party may not invoke the provisions of its 
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.” Conveying the same 
meaning, article 3 of the ILC draft articles on state responsibility for internationally 
wrongful acts insists on the same customary rule: “The characterization of an act of a 
state as internationally wrongful is governed by international law. Such 
characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by 
internal law.”400 This means that the host state's domestic laws and regulations may be 
applied in ITA on two main conditions: first, the absence of investment contract 
providing for "Stabilization Clause"; second, the internal law or regulation in question 
is consistent with the general international law as lex fori. Indeed, it is quite 
impossible to decide an investor-state dispute without reference to the host state 
internal laws, regulations or governmental decisions. It is indispensable for 
investment treaty tribunals to apply the host state's law while deciding both 
preliminary and substantive matters of a given dispute. This essentially includes 
issues of jurisdiction, nationality of the treaty parties and legality of governmental 
acts or omissions vis-à-vis foreign investors.
401
  
Second, I suggest that international investment law should be reconceptualised on the 
basis of international mutual responsibility. The scope of investor-state disputes 
should move beyond the traditional notion of corporate profitability to social benefits. 
For such an end, I argue that the investment treaty tribunal's fullest application of 
article 42 (1) in light of the VCLT customary rule of interpretation particularly under 
article 31 (3) (c) would better accommodate international corporate responsibility into 
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the practice of ITA. Article 31 (3) (c) of the VCLT stipulates that “There shall be 
taken into account, together with the context: any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties.” In addition to the substantive law 
agreed upon by the parties in accordance with article 42 (1), investment treaty 
tribunals may rely on article 31 (3) (c) of the VCLT to incorporate any international 
instruments applicable to the dispute in question into its legal reasoning.
402
 Although 
the second method of reform which is based on the integrationist approach to the 
VCLT general rule of interpretation is much more palatable to most international law 
academics and practitioners, it seems to me impractical in some way. This is since the 
two most prominent attempts to adopt internationalised rules on CSR have never 
entered into force. Intriguingly, both attempts were led under the auspices of the 
OECD. In 1976, the latter adopted guidelines addressing transnational corporate 
responsibility for the first time. Once again in 1998, it proposed a Multilateral 
Agreement on transnational Investment (MAI) including comprehensive rules on 
corporate conduct. Indeed, there are a large number of soft law instruments on CSR 
that have been adopted on the international plane, yet none of which have found way 
to multilateral legal framework. Thus, soft law instruments and preamblar provisions 
on CSR have rarely been encompassed in the law-making process of investment treaty 
tribunal.
403
  
In fact, the natural inclination of the ICSID system towards private interests shows 
hesitancy in giving legal weight to other areas of international law, such as human 
rights, sustainable development or environmental protection. Nonetheless, the major 
shift in state practice towards a more comprehensive version of BITs which account 
for non-investment standards proves to be significant with respect to the development 
of a normative order on corporate compliance.
404
 Yet, the current version of 
preamblar terms has proven to be impractical in informing the treaty parties' intention. 
It offers the investment tribunal a negative rather than positive room for discretion. 
This vagueness has yielded many inconsistent interpretations of non-investment 
standards and consequently has affected the legitimacy of ITA at large.
405
 In order to 
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blunt the one-sided nature of investor-state disputes, Muchlinski suggests the 
inclusion of investor responsibilities along with that of the host state in the tribunals' 
process of interpretation.
406
  
For instance, many states have revised their model investment treaties to account for 
more strict provisions on corporate social responsibility; these include for example, 
the Russian Federation amendment in 2002, France in 2006 and the United States in 
2004 and 2012. Other countries are currently in the process of developing a new 
model BIT such as Argentine, South Africa, Egypt and Turkey. In redrafting the 
treaties, states aim to achieve an “appropriate balance between protection of the rights 
of foreign investors on the one hand, and recognition of the legitimate sphere of 
operation of the host State on the other.”407 From the standpoint of domestic law, 
corporate social responsibility of foreign investors takes place through ensuring a 
minimum standard of corporate conduct. As such, foreign investors undertake social 
and environmental commitments to national laws, regulations, and codes of conduct. 
In addition to the legal obligations, some developing states set up CSR on the basis of 
developmental obligations in domestic infrastructural fields such as healthcare, 
education, public utility, urbanization, sanitation and energy.
408
  
C. THE COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK: ACCOMMODATING PUBLIC LAW 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION LAW-
MAKING 
The chain of global economic crises which erupted in the 2000s has dramatically 
changed the dynamics of the international investment regime. Argentine's arduous 
course of litigation brought about new-fangled defences in the practice of ITA such as 
the state of necessity.
409
 The inconsistent arbitral decisions that grew out of over fifty 
claims against Argentine severely affected the credibility of ITA in advancing host 
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states' economic development.
410
 The emergency measures undertaken by many states 
in the wake of the 2008-2009 financial crises have considerably altered the theory of 
expropriation towards a more nuanced understanding of non-compensable 
regulation.
411
 In contrast to Argentine's case, the US and other European states' 
interventions to contain economic calamity especially in the banking system have 
been faced with great appeasement on the global financial level.
412
 This contradictory 
approach has raised significant questions concerning the scope of state regulatory 
powers vis-à-vis investment protection. More intriguingly, some traditional capital-
importing powers, like the BRICS countries, became key transnational investment 
players in Western capital-exporting countries. This shift in roles between inward and 
outward sources of investment along with some host states backlash against the 
ICSID has been echoed by a new version of BITs which provides for states' 
regulatory measures in public policy matters including health, environment and 
taxation.  
 
States' reaction to the system pitfalls has driven most of investment treaty tribunals to 
rediscover customary principles of international law in order to balance between 
investment protection and state regulation. Thus, public law principles of sovereign 
independence, non-intervention and administrative discretion have been revived in the 
practice of ITA. Investment treaty tribunals' scope of reviewability and interpretation 
of the open-ended investment standards has become in some way limited by 
investment treaty terms. Moreover, sufficient jurisprudential evidence shows variable 
attempts to accommodate public law concepts in tribunals' decision making 
process.
413
 Understanding the regulatory nature of ITA, some academics and 
practitioners in the field highlight the importance of a comparative public law 
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approach to the interpretation of investment standards.
414
 For some, this may be 
realised by reference to the public law principles which are applicable to individual-
state disputes such as the World Trade Organisation's appellate body (WTO) and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).
415
 Others trace the crux of investor-state 
disputes back to the general principles of domestic administrative judicial review of 
governmental actions.
416
 As Professor Crawford aptly noticed, international 
investment law as sub-discipline of public international law "is presently in a period 
of comparative openness and reformation."
417
 It is true that the current "sense of 
fluidity" in the practice of investment treaty arbitration threatens its future as the most 
preferred mechanism for the settlement of transnational investment disputes,
418
 yet 
such fluidity marks an invaluable opportunity towards the substantive self-
reformation of ITA.
419
  
 
The ultimate purpose of this section is to figure out a legal margin for investment 
treaty tribunals in order to reconcile the host state‟s legitimate regulation with the 
protection of foreign investment. Depending on the public law interpretive framework 
laid out in section one, I seek to explore the prospective role of both general principles 
of law and judicial decisions as formal sources of public international law in 
reforming the substantive investment law from within. In sub-section one, I set out a 
comparative public law methodology for refining the content and scope of the open-
ended standards of investment protection. I intend to emphasize the interaction 
between treaty-based investment arbitration and a comparative public law approach 
through referring to administrative law adjudicative principles applicable to 
regulatory disputes. In that sense of use, I propose accommodating the principle of 
proportionality as a general principle of law in major legal systems into the law-
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making process of investment treaty tribunals.
420
 In sub-section two, I lay out a 
"three-step test" for delineating the boundary between compensatory indirect 
expropriation and non-compensable state regulation.  
1. The Legal Foundation for Substantive Investment Law Reformation: 
General Principles of Law and Judicial Decisions 
Investment treaty tribunals must not interpret international investment principles in a 
legal vacuum; rather they have to resort to the concept of sources of International Law 
as enshrined in article (38) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In 
the event treaty terms run out of a legal solution, arbitral tribunals may appeal to 
customary rules of international law. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT) sets forth the legal basis for interpreting the treaty parties' substantive rights 
and obligations. Consistent with the regulatory nature of investor-state disputes, a 
comparative public law methodology seems feasible for informing the unbounded 
substantive provisions of investment treaties. The on-going change towards ensuring 
the host state's right to regulate in BITs terms supports the idea of interpreting 
international investment standards through a public law lens.
421
 As Professor Pierre 
Lalive puts it: "an international arbitration should be decided by a truly 'international 
arbitrator', i.e. someone who is more than a national lawyer, someone who is 
internationally-minded, trained in comparative law and inclined to adopt a 
comparative and truly international outlook."
422
 Therefore, it is crucial for an 
international arbitrator to grasp the sources of international investment law in order to 
define its substance. Unraveling the debate that underlies the different sources of 
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public international law would determine what substantive law applies in the 
resolution of investor-state disputes.
423
Make no mistake, this is not an easy task, 
rather it requires a high degree of legal diligence and objectivity. 
  
In order to address the current pitfalls of ITA, I suggest the integration of new sources 
of international law into the investment treaty tribunals' law-making process. Chief 
among these sources are the general principles of law and judicial decisions.
424
 
Indeed, the content of some reliable sources of general international law may seem 
irrelevant to an arbitrator while deciding a specific dispute because of treaty term 
limitation, notwithstanding the fact that most BITs offer wide latitude for analyzing 
different sources of law. Both general principles of law and judicial decisions are 
encompassed in article 38 (1) (c), (d) of the statute of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) among traditional sources of international law.
425
 Although the essence 
of article 38 (1), which exhaustively enumerates sources of international law, reveals 
no legal hierarchy among sources, general principles of law and judicial decisions are 
often perceived as secondary sources of international law.
426
 Yet, international 
practice has yielded a critical change regarding the concept of sources of international 
law, since states become purportedly bound by new set of norms to which they have 
never been explicitly consented.
427
 The relatively modern concept of jus cogens 
presents a strong proposition in this regard especially that it has a doctrinal avenue 
under article 53 of the VCLT. However, there remains a heated debate concerning the 
cogency of modern sources of international law due to the consent-based nature 
prevailing over the concept of sources under article 38 of the ICJ statute. Nonetheless, 
I confine the present analysis to the traditional sources of international law for the 
purposes of study limitation.  
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Theoretically, general principles of law and judicial decisions come into play through 
filling gaps in the absence of applicable treaty terms, or international customary rules. 
As Sir Hersch Lauterpacht concluded that the "general principles of law may be a 
necessary and inevitable way of filling a lacuna in the interpretation of a specific 
question."
428
 Even though there is no rule of stare decisis in international law 
adjudication whether under article 59 of the ICJ statute or article 53 (1) of the ICSID 
Convention, investment treaty tribunals frequently rely on domestic and international 
law jurisprudence.
429
 In light of this analysis, I contend that the issue does not lie in 
the lack of interpretational means, rather it lies in the misapplication of the existing 
ones. I argue that the legal foundation for a comparative public law approach to ITA 
may be found whether in the VCLT interpretive guidelines or the ICSID conceptual 
framework. On the one hand, the comprehensive application of article 31(3) (c) of the 
VCLT interpretive rules may produce relevant customary international law rules 
applicable between the treaty parties including general principles of law in national 
and international law-based adjudications.
430
 As Stephan Schill asserts, this depends 
on the interpretative leeway allowed under a given international investment 
agreements.
431
 On the other hand, article 42 (1) of the ICSID Convention typically 
provides for the application of domestic law alongside with customary rules of 
international law "as may be applicable"; this may possibly cover general principles 
of law and comparative law jurisprudence. This is no doubt contingent on the treaty 
parties' agreement concerning the applicable law to the dispute.
432
 Yet, a comparative 
public law approach is supported by recent investment treaty arbitrations despite the 
absence of explicit consent by the treaty parties.
433
  
Furthermore, evidence has been found in international investment law scholarship that 
a comparative public law approach may improve the practice of ITA. Some model 
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BITs currently provide for the use of domestic law concepts as general principles of 
law in interpreting and applying the minimum standards of investment protection.
434
 
On their part, investment treaty tribunals have frequently relied on the jurisprudence 
of previous national administrative and constitutional courts.
435
 In the course of 
regulatory takings and environmental protection, recent investment treaty tribunals 
have relied on the US Supreme Court's "Penn Central balancing test" in order to 
assess the legitimacy of regulatory takings in light of the investment-backed 
expectations.
436
 Other investment treaty tribunals have made recourse to the ICJ and 
the European Human Rights Court (EHRC) case law to elaborate on key legal 
concepts most notably full protection and security, indirect expropriation and 
corporate nationality.
437
 For instance, in Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates,
438
 the 
arbitral tribunal referred to the ICJ's Nottebohm case while discussing the issue of the 
investor's nationality. Also in Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador, the tribunal 
drew on the limits of applying proportionality analysis in the course of investor-state 
disputes.
439
 Furthermore, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has been and still one of the 
most reliable sources for investment treaty tribunals. For example, in Saipem v. 
Bangladesh, the Tribunal relied excessively on the latter's case law to assess the 
lawfulness of the state's expropriatory measure.
440
 Drawing on this authority, I argue 
that developing a qualitative methodology for the operation of general principles of 
law in the practice of investment treaty tribunals would help in disentangling the 
competing interests of investors and host states in ITA.
441
  
                                                          
434
 See supra note 423 at 141  
435
 See supra note 421 at 85 
436
 See Karl P. Sauvant, Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy, 2010-2011, P. 784, 
Oxford University Press (2012); See also Thomas Walde & Abba Kolo, Environmental Regulation, 
Investment Protection and 'Regulatory Taking' in InternationalL aw, 50 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 811, 
821 (2001) 
437
 Id. 
438
 Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v. The United Arab Emirates, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7ICSID, Case 
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, (Final award, July 7 2004) 
439
 Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v 
Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11 (Award, 5 October 2012) 
440
 Saipem S.p.A. v. The People's Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, (Final award, 
June 30 2009) 
441
 See supra note 423 at 146-47 
92 
 
2. Delineating the Boundary between Compensatory Expropriation and 
Non-compensable State Regulation: A Three-part Proportionality Test 
The 'threefold' formulation of direct, indirect and acts tantamount to expropriation has 
proven to be futile in application. It has ended up widening the scope of indirect 
expropriation to include most regulatory actions of host states. Investment treaty 
tribunals have never succeeded in drawing the line between compensatory indirect 
expropriation and non-compensable state measure. As previously mentioned in 
chapter two, this formula has no comparable application in any domestic legal system. 
The neoliberal-oriented drafters intentionally introduced them to maintain a normative 
preferential treatment for foreign investors in host states.
442
 The tribunals' expansive 
approach towards inflexible investment protection has largely shackled the host states 
hands in regulating public law matters of common concern relating to the protection 
of health, environment, human and labour rights.
443
 None of the prevailing doctrines 
used by investment treaty tribunals have succeeded in either curbing the unbound 
requirements for indirect expropriation or deciding the scope of non-compensatory 
regulation of states.
444
  
 
In deciding whether an expropriation has occurred, the "sole effect doctrine", 
constituting the mainstream practice of investment treaty tribunals, examines the 
economic impact of governmental action on investment. A minimal deprivation of 
reasonably to-be-expected economic benefit is sufficient to establish compensatory 
expropriation regardless of the lawfulness of state conduct.
445
 The "police power 
doctrine" on the other hand, focuses on the gravity of the governmental action and 
thus lessening of investment benefits to certain extent does not entitle an investor to 
any compensation as long as the regulatory measure is taken lawfully.
446
 This "all or 
nothing" approach of arbitral tribunals is mainly reduced to investigating the 
occurrence of an expropriation instead of assessing its lawfulness or wrongfulness. 
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Since cases of regulatory takings involve wide governmental discretion in proportion 
to public policy objectives, this approach has always yielded imbalanced arbitral 
awards. It is either the foreign investor who gets fully compensated in sacrifice to the 
host state's interest to pursue public policy objectives, or it is the latter that gets 
exempted from expropriation letting the former alone to incur the full economic 
burden of its regulatory conduct. In other words, it is either full compensation or 
nothing at all.
447
  
 
Against this background, I argue that accommodating the principle of proportionality 
into investment treaty tribunal law-making would help inform the definition of 
indirect expropriation.
448
 To the extent that a given BIT terms allow interpretive 
leeway, proportionality analysis may be used in reviewing the governmental action in 
question in order to decide whether it meets the substantive requirements of an 
expropriation.
449
 In contrast to the sole effect doctrine, proportionality analysis would 
account for the host state's right to pursue public policy objectives through exercising 
its inherent regulatory powers. Moreover, it would rationalize the rising police power 
doctrine under some NAFTA arbitrations, particularly in health and environmental 
issues, which has been criticized for undermining the very essence of investment 
protection in investor-state disputes. I believe that proportionality analysis would nip 
the recent notion of judicial activism in the bud as some voices have suggested 
channeling the NAFTA attitude into investor-state arbitrations under the ICSID legal 
framework.
450
 
 
Nevertheless, most states have reacted to tribunals' unrestrained interpretations 
through a new generation of BITs which include more strict terms on state regulatory 
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power with respect to non-investment objectives. Most of the recent BITs have been 
skimmed from the third category of "actions tantamount to takings", embraced new 
defences to the host state's non-compensable interventions and reverted back the law 
on expropriation to its original twofold formula, i.e. direct and indirect 
expropriation.
451
 This on-going conceptual transformation in BITs opens a door to 
consider comparative public law standards of review in ITA law-making. It further 
marks a chance for arbitrators to develop comparative methods, integrate 
proportionality analysis and respond to the competing public-private dichotomy in 
order to keep the system alive.
452
 Kingsbury and Schill confirm this meaning: 
"Proportionality analysis is a method of legal interpretation and decision-making in 
situations of collisions or conflicts of different principles and legitimate public 
objectives."
453
 In order to draw the line between compensatory expropriation and state 
lawful regulation, the principle of proportionality furnishes a restrictive three-step 
test. It is restrictive in the sense that it works within the conceptual framework of the 
BIT in question on the one hand, and the customary rules of international law on the 
other. Further, the test has three main themes that must be considered cumulatively 
yet separately: the suitability of the given measure as to the ultimate object; the 
necessity of the measure in light of its impact on an investment; and finally the 
proportionality between the overall effects of the measure and its legitimate 
objective.
454
     
 
The first step in the proportionality analysis is two-fold. It encompasses both 
psychological and material elements. The former relates to the state's intention and 
whether the challenged governmental measure is taken to serve a legitimate public 
interest. This means that the measure must be adopted for general welfare and on a 
non-discriminatory basis.
455
 The material element concerns the suitability of the 
governmental measure to attain a legitimate public purpose. The arbitral tribunal has 
to establish a causal link between the taken measure and the targeted public purpose. 
Further, suitability of an act entails that such act must be taken in accordance with the 
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due process of law.
456
 In this regard, the tribunal must assess the legality of the 
challenged act in light of the national law of the host state as well as customary 
international law according to article 3 of the ILC.
457
 Thus, if the state action 
constitutes a violation of an international legal norm it would be deemed illegitimate 
even if it is lawful under the host state law. Finally, it may happen at any point that 
the tribunal finds out that the governmental measure is illegitimate, discriminatory, 
corrupt or aimed at private benefit. In any of these cases, the tribunal would not 
proceed to the next two steps of the proportionality analysis.
458
 
 
The second step of the proportionality test involves analysis of the necessity of the 
challenged measure. It questions whether the government could have adopted another 
measure that is less detrimental to the rights and interests of the given investment yet 
equally attain the targeted public purpose as identified in the first step. In that sense, 
the arbitrator has to examine all alternative policies before the decision-maker and 
whether there were more feasible and effective choices that do not equally encroach 
upon the investor's rights and interests as the challenged measure has done. For 
instance, a state cannot justify its regulatory measure either on the basis of suitability 
or necessity in order to violate a fundamental human right under customary rules of 
international law. This means that the second step not only requires examining the 
necessity of the governmental measure compared to other effective public policy 
alternatives, but also the proportionality of the measure to the investor's protected 
rights and interests.
459
     
 
Lastly, in the third step, and if the challenged measure has fulfilled the two previous 
steps, the tribunal would engage in a proportionality analysis stricto sensu that 
initially requires balancing the aggregate impact of the challenged governmental 
measure on the investor's rights and interests with the genuineness of the targeted 
public purpose.
460
 This step is crucial as to deciding whether there is an obligation to 
pay compensation at first, and assessing the amount of such compensation at second. 
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In this regard, proportionality analysis stricto sensu must consider all available factors 
on a case-by-case-basis. This essentially includes, the genuineness and legality of the 
targeted public purpose, the gravity of the regulatory measure, the substance of the 
protected right, the contribution of investor's own conduct, the investment-backed 
expectations, the degree of loss based on a cost-benefit analysis, the quantity and 
period of interference, the available alternative measures and their degree of 
effectiveness and the adequacy of indemnification made, if any. Finally, the third step 
is central to the proportionality analysis in that it restricts the suitability (first step) 
and the necessity of pursuing a public purpose (second step) to the extent the latter is 
proportionate to all other substantive rights and interests involved. In the course of 
deciding the lawfulness of a regulatory measure vis-à-vis an investor, if 
proportionality analysis stops at the second step, the investor's rights and interests 
would be largely jeopardized in relation to an insignificant public interest.
461
  
 
Against what some commentators have suggested that proportionality analysis 
responds to the imbalance BITs, I rather submit that proportionality responds to the 
unrestrained law-making of investment treaty tribunals.
462
 Further, I argue that the 
proportionality test has an advantage over other deferential standards of review, since 
it requires the adjudicator not only to consider the reasonableness of the governmental 
measure ipso facto, but also to go farther in assessing the proportionality of the public 
purpose objectives to the substance of the affected rights. In that capacity, it aims at 
providing a legal interpretation of treaty terms in cases of conflict between competing 
rights and interests of foreign investors on the one hand, and host states on the 
other.
463
 Undoubtedly, the tribunal must stick to the conceptual framework of the BIT 
while interpreting treaty terms using customary rules of treaty interpretation. 
However, investment treaty tribunals may consequently have recourse to 
proportionality analysis to investigate whether the challenged state measure is 
consistent with the governing legal framework under a given BIT. Therefore, by 
making use of proportionality analysis, tribunals are not second-guessing the 
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relevance of host states regulatory measure to public interest, nor do they reinterpret 
BITs provisions on the substantive rights of the parties. It is already settled that the 
treaty parties have given arbitral tribunals the onus to review and correct their own 
public conduct vis-à-vis prospective investors.
464
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is imperative for the purpose of this thesis not to confuse the ICSID's unique private 
model of dispute settlement with the public law foundation of ITA. Since the latter 
essentially emanates from a state sovereign power as a subject of international law. 
Through its consent to the ICSID jurisdiction, a state willingly refers its regulatory 
disputes with individual investors to an alternative dispute settlement to its domestic 
court system. In that sense, host states delegate their law-making power to one-off 
investment treaty tribunals. The logical corollary of understanding ITA as public law 
adjudication is that public law concepts most notably sovereign independence, non-
intervention and administrative discretion have to be duly observed in both 
jurisdiction and merits of investor-state disputes. Despite the fact that B/MITs are 
subject to relative bargain power, term variations and individual limitations, 
investment treaty tribunals have wide discretionary power through the process of 
interpretation. If there is a gap in an investment treaty, the competent tribunal fills it 
in through the back-door of interpretation. From an international law perspective, 
investment treaty tribunals are bound by the customary rules of international law 
applicable to investment disputes. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties lays 
down the legal basis for interpreting the substantive rights of treaty parties in an 
international context. I maintain that this interpretive approach is indispensable to 
reconceptualise the host states' right to economic development as intended by the 
drafters of the Washington Convention. Furthermore, such an approach would allow 
arbitral tribunals, in so far as treaty terms so apply, to integrate rules on corporate 
social responsibility vis-à-vis the host state. International minimum standards of 
investment protection cannot be applied in isolation from corporate compliance with 
national legal rules applicable to investment. It is the duty of investment treaty 
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tribunals to consider these rules provided that they are consistent with general 
international law. I submit that a public law approach to investment tribunals' law-
making process would help map out a predictable space for the host state in its 
exercise of regulatory powers in areas of public policy concerns such as health, 
environment, human rights, finance and taxation. 
   
Investment treaty tribunals must not interpret international minimum standards in a 
legal vacuum; rather they have to resort to the concept of sources of international law 
as provided by article (38) of the ICJ statute. In the event treaty terms run out of a 
legal solution, arbitral tribunals may appeal to customary rules of international law. I 
argue that the integration of new sources of international law into investment treaty 
tribunals' law-making would help define the open-ended substantive standards of 
investment protection. Yet, this entails disentangling the debate that underlies the 
different sources of international law in order to determine the substantive principles 
applicable to a given investor-state dispute. This process requires a comparative 
qualitative analysis of context-related legal principles in both civil and common law 
traditions whether at the domestic or international level. I believe that the on-going 
semantic transformation of BITs would allow for a more nuanced understanding of 
comparative public law standards of review in international investment law. Drawing 
on the regulatory nature of ITA, I argue that accommodating the principle of 
proportionality as a general principle of law into investment treaty tribunal law-
making would help inform the definition of indirect expropriation, delineate the 
boundary between compensatory expropriation and non-compensatory regulation and 
consequently account for the host state's right to pursue public policy objectives. 
Finally, I contend that developing comparative methods in ITA not only enables 
investment treaty tribunals' to resolve interpretational conflicts between competing 
rights and interests of foreign investors and states, but also marks an invaluable 
opportunity for international arbitrators to save the legitimacy of the ICSID at large.  
